

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

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FEATURED IN THIS ISSUE:

Administrative Evolution in ADP in State Government, by Harry H. Fite

Generalist Versus Specialist, by William C. Thomas, Jr.

Sayre and Kaufman's New York, by Norton E. Long

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in this number

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Administrative Evolution in ADP in State Government

By HARRY H. FITE

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AT some future time—say the year 1984—it is quite conceivable that the following chain of events might take place:

A. A report from a remote agricultural county in Utah reporting greatly increased sugar beet production is read into a computer at the state capitol.

B. The computer then takes the following steps: (1) Undertakes the earthwork computations necessary to design a farm-to-market road to facilitate the movement of this crop, prints out the specifications for an invitation to bid for the construction of this road, analyzes the bids received, and prints out an award to the lowest and best bidder. (2) Simultaneously recomputes the assessment of the affected parcels of property in the county concerned, corrects the appropriate records, and prints out the new tax bills. (3) At the same time calculates the increased incidence of dental caries in Utah due to greater sugar consumption and prints out documentation for a budget increase in the appropriation for out-patient dental clinics.

Centralization of this kind would really amount to something as it would clearly reduce the need for a road department, health department, revenue department, and county government. Such a development is not only possible, it is inevitable unless, of course, in the meanwhile substitutes have been found for sugar beets, farm-to-market roads, teeth, and even the farmer.

Conditions for Successful ADP in State Government

In all seriousness, given the necessary stages of evolution in the intervening period, such a

» Centralization of data processing activities is not the way to derive the greatest benefits from computers in state government. Computers are now available to fit different levels of work volume and can be applied in a number of different functional fields. The decentralized approach to the introduction of ADP into state government where computers are installed by individual departments may avoid inherent problems of centralization, make the accommodation of work procedures to computer programming less complex, and reduce political opposition to the introduction of automatic data processing.

pattern would not be as unrealistic 24 years from now as certain current approaches to centralized data processing in state government appear today. To espouse, as apparently is being done in some quarters, centralized data processing in the sense of a single data center performing substantive as well as house-keeping functions seems equivalent to arguing that it would have been possible to skip the stage in animal evolution during which water based organisms adapted themselves to life on dry land.

Before centralized data processing in this sense will be feasible, there must be a period of administrative evolution during which automatic data processing is assimilated function-by-function within the several major and totally discrete areas of state government activity. Stated another way, there must be a period during which the machines are taught, if you will, to perform the highly specialized tasks of public safety, public finance, public works, etc., by those alone qualified to do so—the specialists in these fields. During this period, also, certain accommodations in administrative and human institutions and forms which must accompany radical change in data handling methods will need to be worked out.

Today changes are necessary in such institutions and forms even to achieve the degree of "computer readiness" required for function-by-function automation. Much greater changes will be necessary before centralized data processing can succeed. Some of the reforms required involve great improvements in the machinery of central management in state governments. Others require elimination of certain forms going far back in our governmental tradition. Moreover, some of the institutions that may be affected owe their being not to any relation they bear to procedural economy or efficiency in government, but to the relation they bear to the basic processes of democratic government.

Progress in Adoption of ADP by State Government

To look at the record of state governments in assimilating advanced data processing methods is to discern a considerable lag in comparison to private business and the federal government. Indeed, the October number of the *Newsletter* of the Diebold Group, which was devoted to automation in state and local government, revealed only 130 computers in place in all the state and local government jurisdictions in the United States. It is true that the majority of the states have obtained some sort of a computer to perform engineering computations in their highway departments. Few of these, however, have taken the next step of extending the use of this equipment to the accounting activities in the same departments.

Revenue administration entails mass data handling chores clearly susceptible to electronic data processing, yet only a handful of states have computers devoted to this work. Indeed as recently as 1958 only 17 of the 33 income tax states had even applied *punch card* methods to their accounting processes. A scattering of states in the far West have used computers for welfare work. One or two highway patrols are using them in police work. Within a matter of months several states have applied such devices to their state education departments. Use in motor vehicle departments is gradually gaining momentum.

So goes the roll call. The pattern is one of experimentation, trial and error and adoption on a piece-meal basis wherever departmental receptivity is greatest. In short, the pattern is typical of the way administrative reform has

traditionally taken place in this country—in that sense resembling the process of adoption of the state income tax, the executive budget, and state merit systems, for example.

While one might deplore the pace or rate of progress, one would be most reluctant to discard the process. As a matter of fact, states which have pressed for massive centralized data processing, involving a single administrative organ to provide such service to substantive and housekeeping activities alike, find themselves with fewer application in being than states which have taken the function-by-function approach.

Obstacles to Centralized ADP in State Government

Experimental scientists will tell you that they are guided in their researches by what they call the "law of parsimony." In essence they mean that they always attempt to discard an elaborate hypothesis or solution in favor of a simpler one that will fit the facts. This philosophy is relevant to the problem of applying automation to the processes of state government. When one contemplates the obstacles which must be overcome to achieve any automation in state government, it seems unnecessarily daring to invite the difficulties of immediate all-embracing automation.

The obstacles to even the most modest approach are not difficult to find. They include proliferating demands for service which everywhere out-run available funds, normal resistance to change which is a constant in all human affairs, legal barriers, separatist sentiments deriving from traditional departmental forms of organization, and the fact that some department heads are politically powerful elected officials.

Weak Central Management

The corollary of strong departments in state government tends to be weak central management—weakness both in terms of power structure to compel centralization and in terms of machinery for central planning and operation. Strong budget machinery and offices of administrative planning are still the exception rather than the rule. This pattern poses a very grave impediment to successful automation. Then, the general shortage of skilled manpower—not just skilled in computer use, for this can be readily taught, but more im-

portant, skilled in government management—offers one of the most difficult obstacles of all. Finally, the vast lack of understanding of the advantages as well as the processes of automation among state policy making officials and legislators constitutes a final roadblock of immense proportions.

These obstacles to the installation of a computer in any part of a state government apply also, but not equally, to a centralized data processing approach. To a centralized operation these obstacles apply at a rate approaching geometrical progression. This is so because the centralized approach is doubly radical. To propose the use of a computer is to propose a radically new method of doing state paperwork. To propose doing it on a centralized basis is to propose an additional radical change in the institution of state government itself. All the latent separatist sentiment can immediately be mobilized against such a move.

Becomes Major Political Issue

The whole proposition is brought into the spotlight in a way which would be most unlikely to happen in the case of an application in a single department. This in turn brings other actors onto the scene who would probably not be in the cast of a drama based on a single department—for example, additional legislators, lobbyists, members of the press, and union spokesmen. What should be handled as a change in administrative practice is transmuted into a major political issue. At best the process of change has been made vastly more difficult. At worst the proposal is defeated and it may take years to make a comeback. In the meantime, even department-by-department automation is blocked or materially retarded.

From an administrative point of view, if centralization were the only, or even the best, way of achieving automation in state government, one would be prepared to take on all its difficulties because the ends to be attained would justify it. However, there is considerable reason to believe that it is neither the only, nor the best, way. Let us examine the notion of centralization of data processing on its administrative merits.

Administrative Arguments for Centralizing ADP

In a large measure, the arguments advanced by the proponents of centralized data process-

ing are the classical arguments for centralization of administrative action of any kind.

The Utilization Argument. It is argued that because of the great capacity of a computer to do work no single application will afford adequate equipment utilization—only through the pyramiding effect of combining several applications can you get an economical volume of business. This reasoning is extended beyond the machine to utilization of the staff of analysts, programmers, and operators who man the installation.

Quality Control Argument. It is also argued that, because of the difficulties of mastering the computer art, good results cannot be obtained if every department is going it alone. Therefore, one group of highly skilled specialists must do the job on a service basis to the various users. Only a limited number of people are capable of mastering this business, it is held, so they must be carefully hoarded.

Cost Argument. This argument proceeds from the premise that all electronic brains are "giant" electronic brains and hence only one can be afforded. This will be big enough to do the work of all departments. Furthermore, it is argued that site preparation costs are so great economy dictates only one site be established.

Systems Argument. Much has been made of the so-called "systems approach." This doctrine suggests that everything done with a computer is interrelated—the output of each process becomes the input for the next. Therefore, the argument continues, if all activity cuts across the lines of several departments, the whole job should be done under single auspices.

Centralized Operation Not Responsive

Obviously some of these arguments are questionable. Furthermore, there are some intrinsic problems that would make centralization suspect even though this particular set of arguments were entirely sound. Schemes of administrative centralization have met difficulties again and again in a wide variety of settings usually for the same reason. It has not been possible to make these schemes sufficiently responsive to the needs—or at least, to the demands which as a practical matter amounts to the same thing—of their "customers."

Even though some of the dissatisfaction with

centralization may arise from an unrealistic standard of service or an old-fashioned desire for self-sufficiency, no administrator will gain-say that the sentiments themselves constitute an ominous threat to the success of such undertakings. More often than not, however, there's a substantial amount of fire underneath this smoke. Steno pools, motor pools, central files and more ambitious centralized undertakings, the wartime Central Administrative Services in the federal government, for example, have come to grief because they have in fact been unable to render an adequate quality of service and not from mere capiousness of their clients.

Higher Management Weakness

Such inadequacy of service arises from circumstances over which the unit has no control including the basic difficulty of scheduling a variety of different types of jobs, unforeseen fluctuations in volume, the problem of being unable to establish a foolproof scale of priorities, and the recurrence of "rush" or urgent blocks of work which upset any system of priorities and require *ad hoc* value judgments. It is a rare top management that will stand up and be counted on the matter of priorities and that is prepared to set up adequate machinery to police them. In many cases it has been top management's impatience with its constant role of referee that has led to ultimate disenchantment with central service units. An administrative unit serving only a single master will be beset with some of the same difficulties, but they don't occur to the same extent nor do they engender as much heat.

These operating problems beset centralized service activities of any kind. If they represent a hazard to the success of a straightforward commonplace operation like a typing pool, it seems reasonable to suppose they will constitute an infinitely more serious threat to an undertaking, like centralized data processing, which is already under the handicap of employing a mysterious and alien device. There are many reasons why this should be the case.

For example, the problem of scheduling reaches its most complicated form in automation. First of all, the cost of a computer puts a tremendous premium on its maximum utilization which clearly demands the most precise sort of scheduling. Further, any data proc-

essing "run" will require employment in sequence of several pieces of equipment of differing speeds and capacities which require a most delicate balance among them. Thus, proper work scheduling becomes a most intricate process. It follows, therefore, that this activity is exceptionally vulnerable to sudden changes in workload or changes in priority which require stops and shifts. The re-setup cost involved if much of this kind of thing takes place becomes prohibitive.

Is Centralization Necessary?

It can now be asked if the arguments advanced in favor of centralization are compelling enough to merit an effort to cope with its fundamental weaknesses that have just been described.

Historical Perspective

In evaluating the claim that centralization is required to obtain adequate utilization of the equipment and associated staff, a little historical perspective is helpful. At the time that many states began to consider installing a computer, there was a considerable gap between the most popular small or medium-sized computer and the very large and expensive computers. Therefore, states found themselves facing a situation in which the departmental applications they were considering were a little too large for the smaller ones but much too small for one of the large ones. Given the state of the art at that time—a mere three years ago—the concept of undertaking the work of all departments in one data processing center in order to get economical use of a large computer was quite logical.

Since that time several things have happened in the industry, where technological progress has been unbelievably rapid, which bear on this approach. In the first place, several of the companies have filled out their lines of computers so that there are now available several computers on a scale between the small or medium-sized and the large of a few years ago. Second, the principle of modularity has been applied to computer design. This permits even more precise tailoring of capacity to the needs of a specific situation by the addition or subtraction of certain computer components as well as peripheral gear. Finally, the shift from tube design to transistorized design has materially reduced the site

preparation costs which arose from the size and air conditioning requirements of the earlier machines.

Effects of Technological Progress

The administrator should be most thankful that technological progress has destroyed the relevance of the utilization argument. Had this not happened, he would continue to face a dilemma whose solution was far from obvious. It would be most difficult to decide whether to have an under-utilized computer or to assume the difficulties of centralized operation for the sake of better utilization.

With respect to manpower utilization, there will be more fractional loss of manpower in staffing several computer installations than would occur if all this manpower were pooled. If adequate attention is paid to this possibility in staffing these groups, however, the problem can be minimized. What remains is a small price to pay to avoid the other pitfalls of centralized operation.

The technological progress that has taken place has solved the cost question. With site costs greatly reduced and with such a variety in available equipment alternatives that equipment capacity can be equated with workload, cost as a determinant in a decision about centralizing data processing has become far less consequential.

The quality control argument remains. However much of what those who advance this argument desire—namely higher quality programming and interrelation of interdependent processes in systems design—can be attained without going all the way to a centralized data processing unit. This will be discussed below in more detail. Secondly, an element in the quality argument has been the premise that there are only a limited number of personnel who will be capable of performing data processing chores. It is true that the job of planning and programming of ADP procedures requires persons of intelligence and competence. However, the requirements are not so severe that it would be impossible to find enough people who could be trained to man the maximum number of data processing staffs required to handle state business on an optimum basis.

Understanding Procedures Critical

It should be noted that a comprehensive

study of the personnel problems of automation in the federal government found that the critical manpower factor was people who understood the procedure to be automated not people who could be taught to program a computer. If that is the case, it might very well take as many people to deal adequately with the varied functions of a state government in a central data center as to set up data processing on a function-by-function basis. Indeed, since it has been found easier to train people who know the processes of government to use the equipment than to train people who know equipment in the processes of government, the manpower requirement under the function-by-function approach might even be less than under the former. This is especially likely to be true if judicious use is made of the "open shop" principle.¹

Two things can be said about the systems argument or the contention that centralization is justified because of the essentially interrelated nature of state business. First, where procedures cut across all departments data processing, perhaps, should be handled by a central service department. Secondly, this characteristic attaches only to a specialized and comparatively small segment of state business.

Commonsense Approach to ADP in State Government-Decentralized Operation

Naturally, if possible, a "rule of reason" should be employed which will be in accord with the electronic facts of modern life on the one hand without doing violence to valid traditions of state government on the other. There can be such a rule. In part, such a rule involves applying to the field of data processing the philosophy of the records specialist, namely, central monitorship with decentralized placement and operation. Specifically, this approach could work in the following manner.

Justifying Computer Equipment

In determining the agencies within a typical state whose data processing activities would

¹ By "open shop" is meant the device of training a number of engineers, scientists, statisticians, economists, etc., to program a computer so they may use it from time to time on an *ad hoc* basis to solve a specific problem. Obviously such part-time "staff" would decrease the requirement for permanent full-time data center staff.

justify a computer (bearing in mind the broad range in scale of modern equipment), two principal criteria should be applied: how unique or discrete is the function performed and what is the volume of paperwork. The agencies obviously will differ from state to state, not only because of variations in volume of business, but also because of different combinations of functions in departmental complexes. Consequently, the suggested listing below is in terms of standard governmental functions rather than departmental designations. One further assumption that underlies the listing is that there will be a *comprehensive* exploitation of the potentialities of the computer within *each* of these areas rather than the timid, half-hearted measures quite often found today.

Functions Where ADP Is Applicable

On the foregoing assumptions then, the range of functions which could justify independent data processing installations within a state government might include: (1) public works, (2) revenue administration, (3) unemployment compensation, (4) education, (5) welfare (depending on state-county division of labor), (6) public safety, (7) motor vehicle (vehicle registration and driver licensing), (8) beverage control, (9) workman's compensation, (10) public health (including mental health and hospitals), (11) correction or prisons, (12) finance (budget, accounting, payroll) —(an example of an appropriate central service function), (13) personnel administration (another central service function), and, (14) central service bureau to accommodate needs of smaller departments like health, conservation, agriculture, commerce, secretary of state.

The first eleven of the functions listed are major substantive functions of a state government which are discrete and unique. There is little, if any, overlap or affinity in the processes involved in their discharge. Thus, if there is no utilization or cost advantage to be gained in consolidation of their paperwork activities, there is no point, and a lot of problems, in doing so.

Finance and personnel administration are administrative or housekeeping activities involving, in part at least, processing data that originates in all agencies of state government. Since, in each case, there is a homogeneous body of data, i.e., does not change in intrinsic

character from department to department, and uniformity is necessary in its original format and processing, state-wide centralization of data processing for these functions is entirely reasonable.

The Central Service Unit

A device that may have much merit is the use of a service bureau operation to provide data processing facilities for those departments whose volume of business is too small to justify separate equipment. In such cases the cost and utilization arguments could very well be valid. However, the intrinsic shortcomings of centralization discussed above would certainly apply and the administrator should be convinced that the savings and improved service outweigh the administrative problems.

The locus of a central service bureau in the state complex of departments will naturally vary from state to state. Where a central department of administration exists, it might logically render this service to smaller departments on a computer which it has installed to carry out its own responsibilities relative to budget, payroll, personnel and, possibly, accounting activities. In states not having such a department, this function could be placed in a department of property and supplies, as in Pennsylvania, or in some other such auxiliary service department.

Commonsense Approach to ADP in State Government-Central Monitorship

Clearly, there is a need for a real focus of expertise about data processing in each state government capable of advising the several departments on their problems of application, selection, and installation of equipment. Only by concentration of resources can the average state afford an adequate number of qualified staff to handle advanced problems and bear the responsibility for advising generally on equipment selection and application and upholding adequate standards of use. With this concept of centralization there can be no quarrel. Indeed, it is the lack of such expertise which poses the greatest threat to automation of state government today.

The lack of expertise not only leaves the door open to misapplications, but it also invites overselling and perpetuation of his-

torical situations of monopoly. A very useful adjunct to an internal group of experts is the type of Data Processing Advisory Committee that was created by the Governor of Pennsylvania to aid him in working out an approach to automation in that state. This committee, made up of people well versed in automation from business and university circles, assures the Governor of objective and informed advice in this new and critical field.

Above all, the staff of such a central facility must be, or become, experts in this new art, fully familiar with *all* alternative systems available today. Moreover, states should be fully aware that they cannot meet this requirement by retreading a tabulating section supervisor. To develop the type of personnel that is needed it is possible to take an especially well-qualified "systems" man, a constructive accountant or an operating man, who knows the procedures to be automated and has a flair for analysis, and give him a thorough exposure to all the principal digital computer systems on the market today. To assimilate this much information will be difficult. Anything less means that competitive consideration would be impossible and yet, certainly one important role of central monitorship should be to assist departments in equipment evaluation so that such consideration will be assured.

Requirements for Effective Staff Function

In organizing such a group, however, it is necessary to bear in mind that today, at all levels of government, staff review and approval of line actions of all kinds—personnel, budget, program as well as adoption of data processing systems—are being viewed with increasing disillusionment. Not because the principle is unsound, but because practice, which has universally suffered from penny-wise and pound-foolish funding or incompetent staffing, has not measured up. These staff groups must have an adequate number of appropriately qualified individuals who are animated by the desire to facilitate the accomplishment of the purposes of government. Any other approach to this management de-

vice prostitutes the principle and creates evils greater than those it is designed to eliminate.

Such a central service staff, of adequate size and skill, can make other important contributions. It can monitor and assist in the studies that are made prior to the installation of the equipment to assure that only optimum systems are converted to electronic methods. It can provide advice and uphold standards of systems work, equipment utilization and programming throughout all departments of the state government. Finally it can provide a clearing house for exchange of systems ideas and programs and, where possible, act as a broker of machine time among the several departments in order to level off peaks and valleys in machine utilization.

Summary

It is the thesis of this paper that automation has much to offer state government, but that centralization of data processing activities is not necessarily the way to derive its maximum advantages. In fact, the uncritical adoption of the centralized approach may be self-defeating. Indeed, the grave administrative difficulties inherent in centralized operations of any kind may be multiplied manyfold in the case of automatic data processing.

As a result of changes in the state of the art that have brought medium scale and modular computers on the market, centralization is no longer necessary to create the volume of business required for an economical computer installation, although this may have been true of the large scale computers of an earlier day. This article lists a number of functional fields of state government which may well be able to justify their own computers of the new scale. It is possible, however, that some types of centralization—particularly centralization of activities that cut across departmental lines and centralization of guidance and monitorship—may be desirable. It is not these approaches, but rather a *total* approach which seeks to centralize substantive as well as house-keeping functions, that has been challenged here.

Generalist Versus Specialist: Careers in a Municipal Bureaucracy

By WILLIAM C. THOMAS, JR.

*Assistant Professor of Government
Skidmore College*

IN the Autumn, 1958, issue of this *Review*, James W. Fesler noted that "a number of signs point to the revival of an old agenda item: 'the specialist and the generalist.'"¹ He went on to say that "the generalist 'school' won out over those arguing that a man must administer something and that a knowledge of that something is a necessary qualification for high administrative rank," but that now "new doubts are arising, or old doubts reviving." What follows here is an attempt to raise new and revive old doubts by reporting the findings of a study of the career paths of 90 bureau chiefs in New York City,² a jurisdiction in which the generalist school did not "win out."

Attempts to institutionalize the practical application of the generalist concept in the City have invariably been badly frustrated. The most recent effort was a proposal of the Department of Personnel to provide for lateral entry of college graduates as Municipal

► This study of the career lines of the bureau chiefs in the departments of New York City government found a proliferation of career pyramids or specialized channels of promotion. These channels often resulted in a higher interdepartmental than intradepartmental movement where specialist skills continue to be paramount as individuals advance to higher levels. The findings lead to questions about the relevance, in large scale organization, of past discussions of the roles of the generalist and the specialist.

Internes. It was rejected, in 1955, largely because of the opposition of organizations of civil servants.

Official Career Philosophy

Meanwhile, the official philosophy of the City "career" system has strongly favored career paths which rise more or less vertically, with diagonal movement confined within departments. Appointments and promotions must be by competitive examination wherever "practicable."³ Vacancies must be filled, wherever "practicable, by promotion from among persons holding positions in a lower grade in the department in which the vacancy exists" and "due weight [must be given] to seniority."⁴ There are also in-department experience requirements.⁵ Among the exceptions allowed because of impracticability are the designations of some posts as belonging to the "exempt" and "non-competitive" classes. Appointments to positions in the former category require no examination and those to the latter

¹ "Specialist and Generalist," p. 370.

² With three exceptions, all of the bureaus of fifteen City agencies were included. The agencies: The Departments of Air Pollution Control; Health; Marine and Aviation; Markets; Personnel; Public Works; Purchase; Sanitation; Tax; Water, Gas and Electricity; Welfare; the Comptroller's Office; the Housing Authority; and the Offices of the Borough Presidents of the Boroughs of Queens and Richmond. The word "department" is used generally in the text to refer to all of these agencies. Fifty-seven of the bureaus were line units and thirty-three were staff. The occupational specialties of the bureaus were as follows: Engineering, 22; Medicine, 11; Administration, 10; Accounting, 9; Real estate management, 6; Personnel administration, 5; Law, 4; Social work, 4; Skilled and semi-skilled labor (trades), 3; Unskilled labor, 3; Other, 14.

³ Article V., sec. 6, *New York State Constitution*.

⁴ *McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York, Annotated*, "Book 9, Civil Service Law" (Edward Thompson Co., 1958), sec. 52.

⁵ *Rules of the New York City Civil Service Commission*, amended to Jan. 24, 1955, Rule V-X-4.5.

a "pass" examination—the candidate must be certified as qualified. But even in the cases of these categories—even of the ninety chiefs were in exempt posts and seven were in non-competitive—the incumbents studied were found to have come up through the ranks more often than not, so strong was the philosophy of promotion from within. Although there is official provision for interdepartmental transfers, its degree of effectiveness may be indicated by quoting a now legendary comment of Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia: "It is more difficult to get an employee transferred from one department to another than it is to exchange prisoners of war." It is important to note that the main thrust of the official policy has erected and maintained barriers not to mobility from bureau to bureau, but only to that from department to department.⁶

Mobility in Practice

While the career paths of the ninety bureau chiefs were subjected to the influence of an official policy of such character, the men had, on their climb to chiefship, crossed departmental lines. Indeed, from a certain point of view, there had been a surprising amount of interdepartmental mobility. Eight had moved, by lateral entry, directly into bureau chiefships from employment outside the City service—the most obvious infraction of the principle of promotion from within. To further illustrate the point, twenty-nine bureau chiefs had served in only one department, twenty-seven had served in two, sixteen in three, and five, four, and one had served in four, five, and six departments, respectively.

However, this apparent mobility is seen only from a certain point of view, and that is a partial point of view. When timing is taken into account one finds that the movement tended strongly to take place at the earliest stages of the in-service careers—the lower administrative levels. Over two-thirds of all the City service experience accumulated

by all of the subjects prior to their becoming bureau chiefs was acquired in the departments in which they became chiefs and as the last previous experience before becoming chiefs. In other words, over two-thirds of the City service experience was acquired under conditions of immobility so far as interdepartmental movement was concerned. For the fifty-three persons who had crossed departmental boundaries, the average length of assignments to departments other than the ones in which they became chiefs and prior to assignment to the department in which they ultimately became chiefs, was five years. For the same fifty-three the average length of the assignment prior to chiefship in the departments in which they became chiefs was fifteen years.

The pattern can be accounted for. The work done at the lower echelons required less independent judgment than that at higher levels and, therefore, less knowledge or experience. It was generally acknowledged that the lower skills used in one department were commonly used in others and were of approximately the same level of difficulty and interest in one department as in another. In the absence of machinery for the systematic rotation of personnel, movement was left largely to the initiative of the employees, but they found little to discourage them from seeking new departments to which they could shift. After a few years, however, they tended to find they had become habituated to the workways of the particular units in which they had been working, had an investment in their knowledge of them, and perhaps, had developed special interests in their work. It became more improbable that they would gain from a shift. This is the general contour, with the moves being concentrated in the early parts of the careers. There tends to have been a period of shuffling about, followed by a long period of horizontal immobility.

Mobility was also found between bureaus within the confines of departments. There are two striking differences, however, between the characteristics of these two kinds of horizontal mobility. First, it is not possible to identify any clear pattern of concentration of inter-bureau mobility in any particular time period of the careers. A shift from one bureau to another within a department appeared about as likely to occur at one stage of a career as at another. Second, instances of interdepart-

⁶ The Rules of the City Civil Service Commission specify that the Director of the Personnel Department "may limit eligibility in examination for promotion to persons employed in a certain bureau. . . ." As amended to Jan. 24, 1955, Rule V-X-2. Examination of 60 per cent of the announcements of last promotion examinations taken by chiefs among the ninety disclosed no examination for which eligibility was restricted to any administrative unit smaller than a department.

mental moves occurred twice as frequently as instances of the intradepartmental kind and were engaged in by almost twice as many persons.

Specialization Restricts Intradepartmental Mobility

The significance of these findings is that in a great number of instances the center of gravity of the law—the policy of promotion from within departments—was overcome by the informal dictates of diffusive, centrifugal specialization that characterized the requirements for bureau chiefships. With promotion examinations closed to those from outside a department, with the relative ease of formal interbureau transfers and of any requisite interbureau budgetary adjustments that might be necessary, and with the presumed greater familiarity of department heads with their own employees than with those of other departments, one would expect to find more flexibility in the making of assignments within departments than between departments. The reverse was actually the case because barriers of specialization were raised between bureaus and channels of specialization developed between departments.

Highly focused technical knowledge, intimate familiarity with some particular of the machinery of the City government, personal acquaintance with the special kinds of people who can help get the job done, relevant experience—these are the qualifications soberly considered necessary for the successful operation of a bureau. Because this specialization is within the bureau rather than the department, it tends to insulate the smaller organ from infiltration by other employees of the larger.

In some cases one of the desiderata is considered more important than the others, but whichever one, or combination, is regarded as the paramount qualification, the chief is expected to be more generously endowed with it than any other person in the bureau. As one becomes more qualified, one is likely to ascend the hierarchical ladder, so that those toward the top are the most highly specialized. This condition is exemplified by the case of a chief who, in response to a query about what he regarded to be his most outstanding professional achievement, told of digesting the technical literature of his field and distributing it to his employees. He said that his staff

not only did not have time to read the unabridged literature but would not read it even if they had time. He spoke with pride of a mailing list of people from all over the country who had requested his periodic releases of the digested material. Having the most of what is considered valuable for their particular bureau, those toward the top are less likely to be moved from it and are less easily replaced, than those at the bottom.

Greater Interdepartmental Mobility

Although within each department all of the same similar specialized work processes are likely to be gathered into one bureau, departments often employ many of the same kinds of work processes.

For example, a bureau of accounting will surely find a counterpart in another department, as often will bureaus of personnel administration and maintenance. Many departments have engineering units utilizing specialties which are found in other departments. There are, therefore, channels for mobility which do lead to other departments even though, like auto expressways, there may be no local stops. Concrete examples will illustrate the point. One chief, an auto transportation specialist, served successively in one bureau each in the Department of Parks, the Office of the President of the Borough of Queens, and the Fire Department—and then went to a bureau in the Department of Plant and Structures which became part of the Department of Public Works during a reorganization. Without a substantial downgrading he could not conceivably have moved subsequently to another bureau in Public Works because none utilized his skills. Similarly, an engineer could work for the Board of Transportation reconstructing sewers disturbed by subway construction, then move to the Parks Department on drainage and irrigation, then go to design interception sewers and treatment plants in a bureau of the Sanitation Department which became, with engineer along with it, part of the Public Works Department in a reorganization. But after he arrived in Public Works, had he moved again instead of becoming the bureau's chief, as he did, it is almost certain he would have had to go out of the department, possibly to a Borough President's Office as one of his principal subordinates did—since Borough Presidents'

Offices also have some responsibility for removal of sewage. For all of the work the Public Works Department does that could utilize his special experience and skills is done in the bureau he heads.

This by no means exhausts the examples which might be given. Nor does it note the exceptions—the few moves across departmental lines which involved changing to a new kind of work. The moves within departments were not usually gross departures from the work done immediately before, but, interdepartmental moves were far more likely to offer continuation of specialization. Such a conclusion is consonant with the finding that the instances of interdepartmental mobility decreased as the careers advanced but that intradepartmental mobility did not vary according to the stage of the career.

Although the specialty channels are narrow, they are long enough, on occasion, to reach past the boundaries of the City government itself and offer entrance opportunities to established outsiders. Most such entry was to a definite channel of specialization rather than to general operation within the City's hierarchy. For, by and large, those coming into the service who had spent a substantial proportion of their career outside had settled into a specialty there, had entered the appropriate channel within the service as a specialist and had not strayed from it. The kinds of chiefs who cleaved most strongly to specialties also tended to have spent larger proportions of their careers outside the service and, therefore, lesser proportions inside, than other kinds of chiefs.

Empirical Evidence

The validity of the foregoing conclusions can be supported. The ninety chiefs were divided into three groups, one consisting of the twenty-six who had engaged in the most professional activity,⁷ one consisting of the twenty-six who had engaged in the most partisan political activity,⁸ and a residual body

⁷ As indicated by the offices and committee posts they had held in professional societies and the professional writing they had done over and above that formally called for by their job.

⁸ As indicated by posts held in political organizations and by campaign activity (only one chief qualified to be identified with both of these groups; the problem he presented was resolved by arbitrarily assigning him to the professionals).

of thirty-eight "less active" chiefs. Table 1 shows ninety chiefs classified according to group and to the proportion of their prechiefship career which was spent in the City service:

Table 1

Bureau Chiefs of Selected New York City Departments Classified by Professional and Political Activity and Proportion of Their Careers Spent in New York City Service Prior to Appointment as Bureau Chiefs

| Proportion of Career in City Service | Professionally Active | Politically Active | Less Active | Total |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|-------------|-------|
| All | — | 4 | 5 | 9 |
| Half but not all | 15 | 16 | 28 | 59 |
| Some but not half | 6 | 4 | 4 | 14 |
| None | 5 | 2 | 1 | 8 |
| | 26 | 26 | 38 | 90 |

It is clear that the professionally active group was proportionately the object of the greatest amount of exception to the principle of promotion from within, having engaged in more lateral entry than either of the other groups.⁹

Although they showed the greatest tendencies toward lateral mobility in their entry to the service, their conspicuousness in this regard declined markedly once they were in the service. The members of the politically active group were the most mobile there. Those of the less active group were next. The politically active made an interdepartmental move for each fourteen years of service they accumulated; the less actives made one such move for each twenty years and the professionals, also with a move for each twenty years, were as immobile. The fact that they moved at all, however, indicates the professionals as well as the others did have some facility for moving along specialty channels. And the figures on intradepartmental moves indicate the professionals had less total mobility and were more tightly bound to their specialties than the others. The politically active chiefs spent twenty-seven years in the service for each move within a department, about twice as many as for moves between departments; the less actives had thirty-four in-service years for each internal shift, approximately three-quarters again as many as spanned their interdepartmental moves;

⁹ This device for indicating lateral entry is used because the careers under observation had all reached chiefship before any standardized grade system was adopted in the City which would afford meaningful comparisons about entry levels.

but the professionals accumulated fifty-nine years of in-service experience, virtually three times the twenty found between their interdepartmental moves, for each move made from bureau to bureau without leaving a department. That the professionals showed the least total horizontal mobility once in the service, and the greatest preponderance of interdepartmental over intradepartmental mobility, indicates by two measures that they, who tended to spend the greatest parts of their careers outside, were the group most likely to stay within specialty channels when in the service.

It is important to note that although the three groups varied as to the amount of horizontal mobility they engaged in, for each of the three groups there was less intradepartmental than interdepartmental mobility, indicating that members of all groups are more likely to slide along specialty channels, if they move at all, than to change to a different kind of work in the same department.

Channels Out of the Service

The specialty channels lead not only into but also out of the service. To illustrate, one chief rejected an opportunity to move up the ladder in another department because the proffered post would not allow him to make full use of his specialty. He expected to retire in four years, wanted to go into private practice as a consultant, and felt that the promotion offered could not compensate for the loss of reputation in his specialty he would suffer if he took it. "I know I have the number one job in my line in the country, so they say," he explained.

Many of the predecessors of the chiefs had earlier followed specialty channels to posts outside of the City service. Of the sixty-six persons who occupied chiefships immediately prior to the incumbents studied, nine resigned and twelve retired to continue working elsewhere. The City's retirement and pension policy makes it possible for many to retire at age fifty-five and by following this choice one may enjoy two incomes, one from a City pension and one from newly undertaken employment.

Rate of Upward Movement

The professionals were most favored by exception not only to the principle of promo-

tion from within, as indicated by their amount of lateral entry, they were also the persons most likely to be excepted from the paced ascendancy up the hierarchical echelons of the service created by "due weight for seniority" and in-service experience requirements. This was due in part, of course, to the extent to which they effected lateral entry, conditions limiting the rate of climb being not so likely to prevail in employment outside the City service as in. However, it was also due to relatively quick promotions in the service. Table 2 supports this; it classifies the chiefs by professional and political activity and by time spent climbing to chiefship from the year of their self-supporting employment.

Table 2

Bureau Chiefs of Selected New York City Departments Classified by Professional and Political Activity and Time from First Self-supporting Employment to Appointment as Bureau Chief

| | Up to 28 Years | 28 Years or over | Total |
|-----------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------|
| Professionally Active | 16 | 10 | 26 |
| Politically Active | 12 | 14 | 26 |
| Less Active | 16 | 22 | 38 |
| | 44 | 46 | 90 |

The existence of deviations from the career norm—promotion from within with due weight for seniority—was established by the tracing of the careers of the ninety chiefs. The professional group was identified as contributing the largest proportion of deviations. The professionals, however, had allies in their resistance to the established personnel policies; they could not have achieved the measure of deviation they did without substantial reinforcement from outside and from above.

Group Alignments

Wallace S. Sayre and Herbert Kaufman have described, in their recently published book, *Governing New York City*, how the leaders of the City's bureaucracies—particularly the leaders of employee organizations—have succeeded in their efforts to maximize and protect the career opportunities of their members. These leaders have extended, refined and guarded the rules growing out of the "primary doctrinal rationalization"—promotion from within—thereby increasingly confining the choices which department heads

have in making appointments to those candidates who most closely fit their norms. In these efforts they have been protected by a mantle of neutrality and supported by the civil service reform tradition.¹⁰

The professional bureau chiefs, on the other hand, are backed by professional societies rooted outside the City service, that demand that professional qualifications be held by those who occupy positions which they, the societies, identify as within their special area of competence.¹¹ Allied with the professional societies are numerous civic bodies and other specialized interest groups who are dissatisfied with the level of expertise of the individuals who rise to the bureau chief echelon in the City hierarchy through the orthodox process.¹²

A consequence of an earlier victory by interest groups and professional societies is the professionalized department head. No less than seven of the fifteen department heads, in office at the time the bureau chiefs were studied, were people of high professional standing. As the official appointing officers their influence over the selection of bureau chiefs was, to say the least, significant.

The professional society, the private group closely interested in the affairs of a bureau, and the professional department head—and more often than not the membership is overlapping—are frequently far more concerned with improving the quality (according to professional standards) of bureau chief competence and with increasing the amount of bureau chief energy than they are with matters of civil service morale, continuity in office, and preserving the sanctity of the vertical career system for whatever cause. To their ends they do battle with organized and unorganized career civil servants on such matters as allowing extra promotion credit for formal educational qualifications acquired in lieu of experience and the reclassification of a competitive position as non-competitive to accommodate a candidate with high professional qualifications.

¹⁰ (Russell Sage Foundation, 1960), see pp. 233-235, 405, 412-13.

¹¹ Sayre and Kaufman comment on these alliances and their standard-setting powers. *Ibid.* pp. 409, 410.

¹² Such organizations sometimes succeed in installing members of their own professional staffs in bureau chiefships. The groups and their tactics receive extensive treatment by Sayre and Kaufman. See particularly Chap. 13.

There are, therefore, two camps in competition with each other to shape the career patterns of prospective bureau chiefs in New York City. The one, fostering a vertical pattern with a measured tread, is undoubtedly dominant. The other, promoting career paths which cut somewhat horizontally across the higher levels of the whole City bureaucracy, is nevertheless making its influence felt upon the career system. Both the paths, however, the vertical and the diagonal, are narrow and deep.

Desire for Achievement as a Factor

There is at least one further factor shaping career development that is important to this discussion—the relationship of the individual to his work under the public's expectation that its bureaucracy show some accomplishment. This may seem vague and amorphous, yet it is nonetheless real. It constitutes a pressure for men to do their best work. Even in instances where the influences of the opposing groups may be discounted, the men continue to behave as specialists, for the most part, under this pressure. Supporting evidence of this is shown by the fact that not only the professionally active group, but also the politically active and the less active groups, were far more likely to move from a specialized bureau in one department to a specialized bureau in another department than to a bureau with different specialization in the same department. Although the pro-professional groups undoubtedly foster such specialization, the career civil servant organizations undoubtedly have much more influence on the careers of the two groups of chiefs. On the other hand, the career civil servant organizations sponsored no wholesale interdepartment movement as against intradepartment mobility. Therefore, desire for achievement remains as an additional explanation.

If achievement-oriented specialization played a role in determining what kinds of moves were made, then it cannot logically be rejected as a factor *restricting* movement from bureaus. As a matter of fact, it would have been even more powerful in the latter role.

Conclusion

If it is true as a general proposition that administration grows more common with higher echelons and that one does not need to have knowledge of "something" to admin-

ister that something, it would be logical to expect to find some evidence of increasing leakage from the deep specialized career channels to outside positions as careers advanced to higher bureaucratic levels. None of any consequence whatsoever was found. Instead, a proliferation of pockets, or cones—bureaus—was found, within which the men selected at successively higher echelons tended to be the possessors of more and more particular kinds of experience and, presumably, particular knowledge and skill. What leakage there was tended to occur toward the bottom and flowed far more into what were specialized channels rather than general areas. These conditions obtained both within and without the spheres of influence of the groups identified as having impact upon career patterns.

This research, though narrow in base, strongly suggests a number of things. First, if pressures for specialization can do what the findings described above indicate they have done in New York City, where the policy barrier—"careers within departments"—has been raised across specialist channels, there is a probability they have been at least as strong in some other jurisdictions where no such barrier exists. Wherever massive, complicated tasks are undertaken by large organizations no assumption that they are not as powerful as they are in New York is justified without some specific indication to the contrary. In other large cities, in states, and in the federal government are logical places to expect to find the same kind of development. Indeed, one collection of data pertaining to the federal level contains fragmentary evidence that the career paths of many federal bureau chiefs are grooves of specialization, deepening as they advance, as those of the 90 New York City Chiefs studied were found to be.¹³

Second, it suggests that the old question should be revived: What is it we want when we ask for a generalist? What qualities do we want our administrators to have and what values should they hold? Paul Appleby has associated the root of "generalist," i.e., "general," with "political": As higher level administrators deal with broader areas of governmental

structure and broader publics they deal with that which is more common, and therefore more general. And the more "generalist" administrators are, the "... more their functions have to do with weighing popular and organized opinion."¹⁴ Implicit in the function of weighing opinion is a call for an acute awareness of the political nature of the many decisions which often masquerade as impartial or scientific matters. Also, there is implicit a promise of responsible behavior growing out of that awareness. But politics is not only the weighing of popular and organized forces, it also involves doing something about them once they have been weighed. It is "... the art of 'strategic obfuscation'" and requires "... creative powers to contrive a formula which, because it *does* mean different things to each side, may stop [a] quarrel, with the semblance of sameness, and may enable the factions to proceed peaceably."¹⁵

To raise, now, a newer question: Is the specialization of political awareness, skill and responsibility necessarily incompatible with specialization in "something" to be administered? Are we faced with a clear choice of either generalists or specialists at the bureau chief level? Probably, there is no full choice because the dominant forces in our complicated society are on the side of the specialists.

It never was contended that no specialist could be a good administrator. It stands to reason now that greater efforts to increase the numbers who are good administrators by imparting to them fuller appreciation of the political nature of the power they may wield as public servants, of the breadth and intensity of its impact and of their consequent responsibilities, would be a prudent course.

The increasing of specialists' sensitivity to considerations from outside their specialty channels can be encouraged in a number of ways. One, that bears closely upon the data reported in this piece, is the rotation of personnel from one administrative organ to another. There appears to be no reason to question its soundness as a tactic; if used judiciously, there would not necessarily be a waste of specialized qualifications employees might

¹³ U. S. Commission on Organization of the Executive branch of the Government, *Task Force Report on Personnel and Civil Service* (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1955), appendixes D, E.

¹⁴ *Policy and Administration* (University of Alabama Press, 1949), p. 50.

¹⁵ T. V. Smith, *The Ethics of Compromise and the Art of Containment* (Starr King Press, 1956), pp. 41 and 43.

have and it would allow full advantage to be taken of all promotion possibilities for competent employees. Also, it could be expected to increase their appreciation of the variety and strengths of opinions and interests issuing from government and from the public. However, one cannot assume broad exposure from the sheer number of inter-agency jumps an employee has made. The matter of when the moves were made is of importance. Ten years in one place may do much to limit and fix a man's attitudes and perceptiveness. And when most moves are made on the volition of the employees, as was the case with the New York chiefs—and is usually the case elsewhere—it seems unrealistic to expect them to gravitate to positions that will require serious adjustments in their habits of thought.

There are other approaches. Professional associations which have broadminded leadership can help. In-service training courses can,

of course, be useful. A point of contact where more could be done is in the specialist schools and programs in our universities and colleges. Here future specialists could be influenced at a stage critical for the shaping of attitudes. Resistance to the subject matter may be severe, but if teachers can find ways to reach the students, the dividends could be rich.

However, all of these approaches taken together, though worthwhile, cannot insure the responsiveness and responsibility desired. It therefore seems advisable to strengthen the hands of chief executives, because they are generalists, responsible to the widest spectrums of considerations, in directing streams of policy. One way to approach this goal would be to work to broaden public recognition of the narrowness of the perspectives from which subordinate executives make their judgments.

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Generalist Versus Specialist in the Bureau of Indian Affairs

By JOHN J. HEBAL

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It is doubtful whether the issue of dual supervision, or "functional specialism versus administrative generalism,"¹ is more sharply posed in any other agency than in the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) of the Department of the Interior. Relationships between generalists and specialists have been recognized as a problem in public administration from its beginning as a subject for investigation. It was, however, the noted experimenter with scientific management techniques in industry, Frederick W. Taylor, who first identified the problem of "dual supervision."²

As it relates to field administration, on which this article will be focused, the problem of dual supervision or "the rival claims of hierarchy and specialty . . ."³ is, in its simplest form, whether branch chiefs are to receive instructions only from the regional or sub-regional office head, or also directly from the chief of the same branch in the central office. The question also applies to regional and sub-regional directors vis-a-vis branch chiefs at the next level in the hierarchy. Acceptance of dual supervision, which Simon, Smithburg and Thompson, as well as Macmahon and Millett, feel is required by realism, calls at

» The introduction of a generalist, in the form of an area director, into the organizational structure of the Bureau of Indian Affairs of the Department of the Interior disturbed previous organizational arrangements. The broad functional responsibilities and centralized organization of the Bureau of Indian Affairs prior to the change had resulted in habits of specialist dominance and independence. Adjustment to the change in structure has ended in a power equilibrium between the generalists and specialists the visible symptom of which is a type of dual supervision where neither dominates.

least for important modifications in the older concept of unity of command.⁴

Another aspect of the generalist versus specialist problem is considered by Fesler. He notes that greater specialization is ordinarily possible at the central office—that by comparison with the central office staff, field personnel tend to be generalists. Although this is less true in a regional or sub-regional office in which each central office branch is represented by a counterpart specialized unit, even in such cases the regional office will usually be less specialized than the central office. This fact contributes to tension between the several levels of decreasing specialization. Fesler remarks that: "Specialists distrust generalists, particularly those generalists at the bottom rather than the top of the organization chart. . . ."⁵

¹ Earl Latham, *The Federal Field Service, An Analysis with Suggestions for Research* (Public Administration Service, 1947), p. 3.

² Leonard D. White, *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration*, 4th Ed. revised. (Macmillan Co., 1955), p. 109.

³ John D. Millett, "Field Organization and Staff Supervision," in *New Horizons in Public Administration*. (University of Alabama Press, 1945), p. 98. Millett reports on the explicit recognition of dual supervision in the Army Service Forces.

⁴ Herbert A. Simon, Donald M. Smithburg and Victor A. Thompson, *Public Administration* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), pp. 214-15; Arthur Macmahon, John D. Millett and Gladys Ogden, *The Administration of Federal Work Relief* (Public Administration Service, 1941), Ch. 11, "The Rival Claims of Hierarchy and Specialty."

⁵ James W. Fesler, *Area and Administration* (University of Alabama Press, 1949), p. 67.

Broad Scope of BIA Functions

Certainly no exaggeration is involved in asserting that the functions of BIA are as broad in scope as those of any agency of the United States Government. Even with the recent transfer of health and agricultural extension activities to other agencies, it is probable that in its concern with the entire span of Indian life, seen in its emphasis on both social services such as education and welfare, and its protection of Indian natural resources, the BIA is the most complex and multifaceted of any government agency in this country. Thus the generalist-specialist dichotomy arises with particular force in an agency in which each generalist, whether the Commissioner, an area (regional) director, or a superintendent of an Indian agency, is necessarily without professional training in all but a narrow segment of the work he supervises.

The BIA is a three-level organization, with areas, usually including several states, and Indian agencies within each area, often consisting of several reservations. At each level it has divisions of resources (roads, realty, forestry, soil and moisture conservation) and of community services (education, welfare, relocation, law and order), as well as of administrative services (including credit and extension). It provides, in effect, general government for Indian reservations. On each reservation an elected tribal council represents the Indian people, and often carries on business enterprises, such as the Menominee lumber mill, with supervision and ultimate control normally remaining with the BIA. The BIA has long operated a cradle-to-grave "welfare state" for its clientele. However, since the inauguration of the "New Deal for Indians" under Commissioner John Collier in 1933, Indian consent, and indeed participation in decision-making through a revived system of tribal councils and through Indian pressure groups such as the National Congress of American Indians and the Association on American Indian Affairs, has assumed a more prominent role. As part of its resource function, the BIA builds and maintains roads, sells and manages land, and operates a forestry branch with functions of timber management comparable to those of the U. S. Forest Service. In the arid western lands, it plans and executes soil and moisture conservation programs similar to those of the U. S. Soil Conservation Service.

It is responsible for administration of grazing lands, installation and maintenance of irrigation systems, and, until 1956, had an agricultural extension function. The BIA also makes loans available to tribes and individuals. In the field of community services, the BIA operates elementary, secondary and trade schools. It has a staff of social workers, cooperating with state welfare officials in meeting Indian needs. Since 1950 BIA has operated an off-reservation employment service, with relocation offices in several major cities. It is also responsible, on many reservations, for law and order, through an Indian police system and through tribal courts.

Since 1953, much of the Bureau's emphasis has, at the direction of the Congress, been on withdrawal of these federal services.⁶ A number of small tribes have been "freed" from BIA control and supervision, while final termination of services for two of the larger tribes, the Menominees of Wisconsin, and the Klamaths of Oregon, is scheduled for 1961. It is expected that these tribes will receive such governmental services as they require from the state, often aided by a federal subsidy. Most of the non-routine decision-making in all areas presently affected by this withdrawal program concerns its implementation. Negotiations with state officials absorb much of the area director's time, as well as that of branch chiefs and superintendents. This is also the major business of the affected tribes; in some cases they have been reluctant to be "freed" and have appealed decisions about their future to the Central Office. It is with this problem of withdrawal programming that the area director finds his coordinative skills most severely taxed and about which conflicts between generalists and specialists are most likely to arise.

Who Shall Control?

Problems between generalists and specialists began to arise as soon as specialization developed in Indian administration, certainly by the late Nineteenth Century.⁷ For present

⁶ Secretary of the Interior Fred A. Seaton modified this policy late in 1958 to place more emphasis on the preparation and consent of affected tribes for this change.

⁷ See John J. Hebal, "Field Administration of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in Minnesota and Wisconsin." Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota, 1959, Ch. III.

purposes only the post-World War II period will be emphasized.

Pressure to Regionalize

Not until genuine authority was delegated to a level intermediate between the Commissioner and the superintendents did the generalist-specialist problem emerge with sharpness. Previously, in his relationships with specialists on the agency staff and in the Central Office, the Indian agency superintendent had the same problems to confront, but information is lacking on the approaches of the several hundred incumbents of the ninety or more superintendencies to their solution. Probably, these approaches were almost as varied as the personalities of the men involved. Although there were a number of earlier hesitant steps toward the creation of a regional organization within the BIA, not until 1946 were area offices established at the regional level with the intention of delegating significant authority to a generalist, the area director.⁸

Regionalization of the BIA, through the establishment of areas headed by directors, began after the end of Commissioner Collier's sixteen-year administration. Pressure from the Office of the Secretary, together with strong criticisms from the House Appropriations Committee, made reorganization, long considered, a necessity. Among the prime movers was Under Secretary of Interior, Vernon D. Northrop. He felt that staff in the BIA Central Office was devoted largely to routine case work instead of the policy formulation and inspection functions which he thought appropriate, and which he thought were not being effectively performed. An intermediate organizational level with substantial delegations was the solution finally agreed upon to make the Central Office more effective for purposes of planning, control, and supervision. Equivalent delegations to ninety-odd agencies were not thought to be practical, because of the cost of providing sufficient specialized staff at that

level. Had that been done, the problem of span of control would have remained.

Dual Supervision Endorsed

Considering that the achievement of these purposes depended on delegations of authority and clarification of relationships between units, it is surprising that it was not until early 1948 that an order was issued on "Relationships between Units." This order evidently was prompted, at least in part, by a sharply critical letter from an area director, who had found his efforts to make the new organization effective thwarted by the lack of clearly defined authority. While this order established the authority of area directors over superintendents, it was not until the following year that the generalist-specialist relationship was clarified. In an almost explicit endorsement of dual supervision, an order was issued which indicated the position of a line officer in relation to a staff officer from a higher level in the organization:

Technical advice rendered by a staff officer to a lower level of organization may not be disregarded by the line officer (or his staff representative) to whom the advice is given. The line officer must either follow the technical advice or refer the matter with his objections to a common superior for resolution.⁹

This appears to be merely another way of saying that when "advice" is given to an area director or his staff on technical matters by a staff representative of the Central Office it is in effect an order from which he has the right of appeal. The superintendent and his staff are in the same position in relation to staff personnel from the area office.

In an effort to soften the impact of this grant of authority to specialists over generalists, the order also states:

Despite the implicit power to obtain directive authority by his superior line officer, a staff officer should resort to this power as infrequently as possible. Action should be obtained through informal agreement and through the wisdom of recommendations rather than through the exercise of staff authority.

In effect a counsel to specialists to try persuasion before resorting to compulsion, this

⁸ Delegations were made possible by the Delegation Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 939), and area offices were created by U.S. Office of Indian Affairs Order No. 538, dated September 17, 1946, although these offices were actually opened about July 1, 1946. These offices were at first called "district offices," and the official in charge, "district director." Later the term "regional" was substituted, and finally, in 1949, "area" was adopted.

⁹ Supplement No. 3 to Order No. 549, dated November 8, 1949.

provision is sound from a human relations standpoint. The existence of the authority doubtless exerts a strong pressure on the line officer-generalist for seeing "the wisdom of recommendations" and coming to an "informal agreement." Although no "advice" is final unless accepted as such, a line officer would be most reluctant to trouble his line superiors too often with appeals. Except in a few important cases, therefore, "advice" from specialists is for all practical purposes final. The generalist-specialist relationship outlined in the BIA Manual has stood essentially unmodified since 1949, although in October 1955 the sentence calling for reliance on informal agreement instead of exercise of staff authority was deleted.

Generalists Resisted

During at least the first three years under the regional plan considerable resistance to the role of the area directors was shown by Central Office specialists and their area office counterparts. These specialists had previously had undisputed line authority and the lack of an intermediate supervisory level had made it difficult, except in unusual cases, for the Commissioner to assert himself. His span of control was simply too great to permit him to exercise other than sporadic control except in major problem areas. Thus many specialists resented and resisted the area director as a threat to their line authority and relative independence. Initially the area director was himself without line authority. In the view of former Area Director E. Morgan Pryse, for example, his functions in the first years were "not much more than programing work."¹⁰ This state of affairs continued until 1950 when as a result of continual pressure from Congress, the Office of the Secretary, and a newly appointed, hard-driving, and highly effective Commissioner, Dillon Myer, these problems were largely resolved in favor of the area director. Dual supervision has been the primary technique through which the resistance of the functional specialists has been accommodated; they have been allowed to retain a large measure of their line authority, under the name of "staff advice."

Indian Leaders Object

Hostility to the new area directors was not

limited to the functional specialists. Most of the Indian leaders objected to the intervention of a new supervisory level, which they feared would limit their access to the Commissioner, and would deprive their agency superintendent of accustomed powers. Even today acceptance by the Indians is lower than by BIA staff members. Resistance to change tends to be strong among many Indians, particularly when the reasons for change are technical, administrative reasons. If in this they are different from other clientele groups, such as farmers, it is only in degree.

Generalists "Controlled" by Subordinate Specialists?

Although the BIA Manual refers only to obtaining of directive authority by staff officers over line officers below them in the hierarchy, another possibility ought not to be overlooked. That is that a staff officer, a specialist on the staff of an area director, let us say, might indirectly obtain directive authority over his line superior, through the intervention of the Central Office staff officer. A thwarted specialist, theoretically subordinate to his generalist line superior, might thus have the "last say" after all. Given the close relationships between specialists at all levels, this "line-running" has happened on many occasions. While the line officer at area and agency levels is the "captain" of the specialists on his staff, he is also in some sense their "captive."

Alternative Use of Term "Dual Supervision"

This possibility suggests an alternative meaning of dual supervision: the supervision of a line generalist by the line generalist above him in the hierarchy, and by the staff specialists both above and theoretically subordinate to him. Although it is true that the specialist is really an independent decision-maker in relatively routine technical matters, with only the most perfunctory participation by the generalist, on matters of greater importance, generalist participation is much higher. However, the area director's decision is, in a real sense, "supervised" by the specialist, who potentially can obtain the authority to force his views.

This possibility of "supervision from below" should not be over-emphasized, but it does need to be recognized in any discussion of rela-

¹⁰ Interview, Washington, D. C., February 9, 1958.

tionships between generalists and specialists.¹¹ Aware that such circumvention by his staff is possible, the area director is more likely to accept their advice, or in consultation with specialists at the next level in the organization, to determine whether the views of specialists on his immediate staff are supported. One might think that specialists would be reluctant to take issues to the next level of specialists with frequency; granted the professional solidarity involved, however, conflicts of any importance with the supervising generalist would normally be so handled. Indeed, for a forester, for example, not to appeal for support to the chief of the forestry branch at the next level on an important technical issue would tend to be considered a violation of professional ethics.

Obviously the viability of generalist supervision depends upon the normal acceptance of staff advice. Frequent refusal to take advice usually would be regarded by his superiors as an indication of incompetence, resulting in removal or transfer. Both generalists and specialists, therefore, must have an appreciation of the nuances in relationships which this discussion has suggested, if the purposes of the organization are to be advanced with a minimum of conflict. A close understanding of the role of each is prerequisite to stable relationships.

Human Values Suffer

One critical problem arises because a large proportion of the BIA generalists come from technical, resource fields or administrative services. Staff advice in one of the concrete resource fields often is accepted more easily than staff advice related to community services. It is one thing to adopt without much resistance the views of the soil and moisture conservationist; it is quite another to accept, or even understand, programs from the social worker or the relocation specialist. A road engineer-turned-generalist is not in a good position, in most cases, to appreciate sociological knowledge that may be contrary to popularly accepted beliefs. He is less ready to admit

his professional limitations in matters concerning human relations that lie within his own experience than the social worker-turned-generalist is to admit that he knows nothing about, for example, the equally technical aspects of road building. The human values central to Indian administration have often suffered because of this difficulty, and the problem of obtaining sympathetic understanding and support for welfare and relocation activities is relatively acute.¹²

The Generalist as Coordinator

In addition to his functions of control and supervision, the generalist line supervisor is responsible for integration and coordination of the work of the several functional specialists. A position athwart the flow of communications is invaluable to the area director and the superintendent in their efforts toward integration and coordination. Almost the only device for coordination which the regional coordinator, an antecedent of the present area director functioning only in the Lake States and Oklahoma, had available was his receipt of copies of some of the letters which passed between specialists in the field and in the Central Office. Area directors, while in a very much stronger position, have found this device helpful. Especially in the 1946-50 period, while the new regional organization was slowly developing, the area directors frequently were by-passed by communications between the functional specialists.

Relations Between Specialists

Just as the generalist must refer technical matters on which he and a single technical specialist are unable to agree to their common superior, so also must disagreements between two or more technical specialists on his staff be referred to higher authority. Minor differences of view may be subject to mediation and compromise by the generalist, but any deep-seated difference apparently involving the integrity of a specialty would have to be resolved at a higher level. In fact, cases of such disagreements are infrequent. Because of well-defined specialties, the work of those specialists most likely to disagree rarely crosses. The com-

¹¹ The writings of Mary Parker Follett were probably the first recognition of this possibility. See, for example, her "The Illusion of Final Authority," *Bulletin of the Taylor Society*, 1926, Vol. 11, as extracted in Albert Lepawsky, *Administration: The Art and Science of Organization and Management* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), pp. 326-27.

¹² The education function no doubt sometimes meets the same problem, but it is better established as a widely recognized profession, and of much older status in the BIA, so better able to protect itself.

munity services specialists have little to do with the resources specialists. Within each group one specialist is normally paramount for any project or problem. Contacts between specialists are almost always informational and consultative, rarely involving joint recommendations or joint administration of a program. Thus, the likelihood of serious conflict is minimized. Relationships between specialists have been good, with few conflicts requiring resolution. Part of the explanation may lie in the necessity for working out problems jointly before the introduction of the position of area director; habits of cooperation developed before 1946 have persisted.

Area Director a Center of Communication

Since 1950 regulations have required that all correspondence between functional specialists at the agency and area levels go through the area director. Also, in normal cases, Central Office specialists are required to communicate with agency and area levels through the area director.¹³ The area director can usually identify at a glance those letters which are more than routine; normally his time permits him to read these, while dismissing the others. Thus, the area director is informed about current activities in the several branches and can identify situations requiring his intervention for purposes of coordination and supervision. This review is primarily informational in purpose, although the area director may decide that other specialists need to be brought in on the problem or that a matter which appears routine actually raises important problems of policy.

The coordinative energies of the area director are concentrated on the withdrawal program and other major problems of policy and programming. There is little need for extensive day-to-day coordination of routine tasks which make up the great bulk of the specialists' work. Patterns of coordination for routine work are well established and normally function without the area director's intervention.

Generalist Control at the Agency Level

The position of the superintendent in relation to specialists on his staff is somewhat different from that of the area director. While

the area director was imposed as supervisor over a staff-in-being, the members of which had previously held line authority, the superintendent, with only minor exceptions, has been continuously in full charge at the agency level during the present century. He has not had the problem of gaining control over a resistant staff of specialists such as confronted the area director. Also, it may be that specialists on the agency staff, having primarily a non-supervisory job and normally no layer of specialists below them, accept the fact of their subordination to the superintendent more easily.¹⁴ Moreover, the strong tendency of specialists at the agency level to be generalists relative to the more specialized staff layers above them may contribute to a lessening of generalist-specialist tension at that level.

Conclusion

The issue of functional specialism versus administrative generalism has been posed with particular sharpness in the BIA because of the relatively late and recent introduction of a generalist, the area director, with significant authority over specialists intermediate between the Central Office and the agencies. The authority of the area director over staff specialists was established slowly and with difficulty, and finally, in a form of dual supervision. It has been suggested that to obtain even grudging support of the staff specialists for this new level of supervision it was essential to allow them to retain a large measure of their authority.

Power Equilibrium Remains

The present status of dual supervision can perhaps best be described as a power equilibrium, not fully satisfactory to many of the participants, but likely to persist as a long-term pattern. It is probable that the authority of the functional specialists can be reduced only as BIA functions are transferred to the states and other federal agencies. As the range of BIA activity narrows, it will become more manageable by the area director.

While the present arrangements are not fully satisfactory to all participants, there does

¹³ Indian Affairs Manual, Ch. 15, Sec. 1.4 (15 IAM 1.4), dated May 24, 1957. Closely follows earlier provision.

¹⁴ The supervisory responsibilities of agency staff are normally exercised over non-professional or semi-professional personnel, although occasional exceptions in a field such as forestry must be recognized.

not appear to be any severe loss of coordination under this dual supervision. On non-routine problems which require coordination, it is quickly supplied by the area director, if not by the specialists themselves. The generalist has a somewhat more limited role than usual, but through the powers of control and supervision that he has he is able to hold the area organization to the purposes established by the top political decision-makers. He is also able to promote cooperative relations with other related federal agencies and with the states.

It can be argued that the present program of the transfer of functions to other agencies and the states would virtually require the creation of the position of area director, even had it not earlier been established in response to internal administrative necessities. Dual supervision in BIA has not slowed decentralization in recent years. Present delegations of authority to the area and agency levels are believed to be satisfactory. No doubt resistance from Central Office specialists hampered decentralization greatly in the initial years of the area offices.

While there seems little reason to believe that the problem of dual supervision has been critical, it has been an important part of the

many control problems of the area director. It seems evident that the generalists, from the Commissioner through the area director to the superintendent, must maintain effective control over the specialists if the administration of Indian Affairs is to be responsive to popular control through the Congress, the President, and the Secretary of the Interior. Popular control can, quite obviously, not be effected through a diffuse structure of specialists without enough central direction and coordination to hold the organization to establish policies.

The function traditionally assigned to the specialists has been primarily that of offering staff advice to the generalists, as clearly recognized by the BIA in its structural organization. While theoretically this may be the correct relationship, the observation of Simon, Smithburg and Thompson that specialists often have the power of command¹⁵ is amply supported by study of the BIA. The concept of dual supervision has been formalized in the BIA Manual and impinges on the control authority of both superintendents and area directors. But in its frank approach the BIA is not unique and gives further reason to question such "myths" of organization as unity of command.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 287.

OTHER ASPA PUBLICATIONS

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Reviews of Books and Documents

Sayre and Kaufman's New York: Competition Without Chaos

By NORTON E. LONG, Northwestern University

GOVERNING NEW YORK CITY: POLITICS IN THE METROPOLIS, by Wallace S. Sayre and Herbert Kaufman. Russell Sage Foundation, 1960. Pp. 815. \$8.50.

THE authors, in a disarming introduction reminiscent of but not copyrighted by Harold Stein and Kipling, avow "THERE ARE PROBABLY A HUNDRED WAYS to write about the government and politics of New York City." While this amiable tolerance is in the best spirit of academic freedom, and while analytically it may be true that there are a hundred or equally plausibly an infinity of ways of writing about the government and politics of New York City, one would hope that there are not a hundred ways for competent political scientists to write an acceptable description of the government and politics of New York.

The Unique and the Comparable

The present work is a major essay in comparative government, the government of the nation's largest city, one of the largest in the world. This gives the subject a seeming *prima facie* importance that would perhaps not attend a like treatment of the nation's smallest city. Nonetheless, the study is of a city, a city which, however large, somehow one hopes still fits meaningfully into the category of cities. While the immensity of New York perhaps leads the authors most frequently to compare the mayor with the governor of the state and the president, in general the comparisons, express or implied, are with other cities. Possibly the writers, despite their strong local patriotism, would agree that the unique is not significant and the significant not unique. New York may be interesting because it highlights differences of scale. Beyond this its magnitude may offer little that instructs. If we are to have a science of government, we

must have comparables and be able to make comparisons. The authors' own concern with a clinical detachment and the objectivity of medical researchers bespeaks a commitment to fact and a desire to advance the state of knowledge. Indeed, quite modestly they express the hope that "such an analysis (as theirs) may also advance slightly the struggle to develop more rigorous and accurately predictive theories in social sciences."

The latter is an object devoutly to be hoped for. If it is to come to pass, certainly one of the major obstacles to be overcome is the gross lack of theoretical and practical agreement on the questions researchers should routinely seek to get answered when they do comparative government studies. Pendleton Herring once remarked that, after many sessions of the S.S.R.C. Comparative Government Committee, it had proved impractical to agree on a check list of questions that any political scientist would want to ask of the data in describing the government of a foreign country. It is rumored that the committee has made some notable advance from this bleak impasse.

Inter-City Comparison Difficult

The job of inter-city comparison is no easy one. Comparisons are not only odious, they are difficult—perhaps difficult because odious. Despite the long history of 1313 and the ICMA we are still largely in the dark as to how to make meaningful comparisons of municipal expenditures. In fact, most municipal officials will tell you that inter-city comparisons are largely valueless except when they serve to rationalize their own demands. The difficulty of these comparisons stems not only from the political convenience of obscurity but equally from the technical problem of developing significant standards of performance measurement. The work of Ridley and Simon stands as a rather lonely monument to the attempt

to introduce objective yardsticks into a field ruled by gossip, opinion, propaganda, and hunch. There are excellent reasons why municipal officials should rejoice in the uniqueness of their cities. There are equally excellent reasons why scholars and administrators should seek to explore the dark continents of uniqueness and make comparisons however odious.

In an important sense the single-city study and the single-nation study are the most conspicuous variants of the case study problem. This is an old issue in the field of public administration. The case like the story is valuable for its moral. What the moral is we would rather not say explicitly. How one would test it, or whether one could or should, are postponed as ill-natured questions that it is bad manners to ask.

How We Know What We Know

The consequences of the failure to ask the moral and the means of its testing is a shift in the standards of judgment from the scientific and factual to the literary, the aesthetic, and the "voice of experience." Political science does not suffer from a paucity of data, hypotheses, and propositions. Quite the reverse, we have such a full everyday familiarity with the data and such a rich lore of common-sense interpretation that we demand of description the richness of a highly textured novel. Plausibility and literary verisimilitude become the canons of judgment rather than verification. It is as if the psychologist were held to a literary competition with Dostoevsky. Or, in place of this literary standard which is more fully applicable to the works of our colleagues—the historians—than to our own efforts in contemporary institutional historiography, the canon of judgment may be that of the consensus of opinion, gotten one doesn't quite know how, of knowledgeable men of affairs, or of academic, political, or reportorial practitioners.

The problem of verification is not merely picky. It is central to the question of how you know what you know. To answer this one must have a conception of how one can be wrong and what tests one thinks apply to proving one wrong. Only if one has said something in such a way that it can be proved false does the reader have a chance of gaining that

horrendously termed thing, intersubjectively transmissible knowledge.

If Sayre and Kaufman are right that there are a hundred and perhaps more ways of writing about the government and politics of New York City, this may come precious close to defining this type of writing as an art form and the statement may mean the same as saying there are a hundred ways of painting pictures of New York. If so, we can hang Sayre and Kaufman in the gallery and politely murmur *de gustibus disputandum non est*.

The Role and Value of the Case Study

The serious vice of the single case study is that you can prove anything and nothing with the single instance. The supposedly self-contained description of the unique universe is not really self-contained. If it were, it would be radically unintelligible. In fact, the single case gains its meaning by constantly stated, and too often unstated and unconscious, comparison with other and unrepresented cases. This means that author and reader alike are in the dark as to just what the comparison means beyond a reference to the assumed community of common-sense interpretation between them.

Implied Standards

When we say the Mayor of New York is strong, not so strong, weak, or what you will, there is an implied standard of measurement vis-a-vis past mayors of New York and in all probability, for most readers, mayors of other cities. The meaning of such a statement, without precise interpretation, must rest on the sheerest common-sense notions of the reader. The same holds for every other term such as council, party, and the like. Since the comparisons are bound to be made, the reader and the writer are helped by making them explicit with examples and other devices to convey more precisely what is meant.

There is a respectable body of anthropology that believes in the possibility, even the strict necessity, of describing single tribes all by themselves. Political scientists and students of administration are not alone in their penchant for case studies. While one may raise doubts that these studies are as valuable for scientific purposes as truly comparative studies would be, those enamoured of them can well rejoin, "produce the better mousetrap." Clearly, the most effective criticism of the existing litera-

ture is the production of the literature one thinks superior.

The Case Study Tests Theory

Professor Donald T. Campbell in a paper on "Some Contributions of Anthropology to Psychology and Some Psychological Comments on Anthropological Method" remarks:

It is probably so that the testing of psychological theories must remain a very minor part of the research agenda of the anthropologist. In addition, the great difference in task must be recognized between the descriptive, humanistic task of one who seeks to record all aspects of a specific cultural instance and the task of the abstractive and generalizing "scientist" who wants to test the concomitant variation of two isolated factors across instances in general. Cooperation between these orientations is often difficult—but is helped by the recognition of the great difference in goals: too often those in one camp regard those in the other as the willful practitioners of a wrong-headed approach, implicitly assuming a common goal.¹

Professor Campbell goes on in this paper to show the great value of anthropological case studies as data for the editing of psychological theory. Thus he points out that Freudian theory based on the data of the Vienna consulting room explained sons' prevailing hostility toward fathers as based on resentment directed toward the father as the mother's lover. Hedonistic learning theory would find equally, or more, plausible the explanation of the hostility as caused by the father's role as disciplinarian. Separating the two hypotheses for testing was impracticable in the Vienna situation. However, anthropological case studies provide evidence of other cultures in which the disciplinarian role is taken on by uncles or others. In these cases, the prediction of hedonistic learning theory is borne out. Hostility is directed toward the disciplinarian rather than the father.

In a similar way one might hope that the descriptive, humanistic task of writing case studies of political institutions could contribute to the editing of empirical theories about politics. To do so the humanistic descriptive studies of political institutions will have to submit to some of the critically self-conscious rigor and control of the anthropologist and the historian. There is no law to com-

pel this. It isn't presently done. But given the kind of contribution that Sayre and Kaufman affirm that they wish to make toward developing a predictive science of politics, it needs a high place on our disciplinary agenda.

So much for the general question of case studies and its bearing on the relation of descriptive humanistic studies to the aspirations toward a science of politics. Now to Sayre and Kaufman's New York. This is a richly rewarding volume, not for its style, not for any revealing inside stories, but for a massive set of relationships given a manageable ordering, for an enormous mass of data, and for a rich store of shrewd hunches and keen insights that those who are less imaginative and who are more endowed with leisure for investigation will want to frame as hypotheses and test.

New York Politics a Contest for Prizes

The authors have chosen as a scheme to order their material the device of treating the government and politics of New York as a contest for prizes. This in their terms is to describe the *process* by which the city is governed. In general, this places the intellectual orientation of the authors in the same line of thought as their colleague, David Truman, and the philosopher of the interest group school, Bentley. The principal problem with the authors' use of the notion of the government and politics of New York City as a "contest for prizes" to integrate their data is that the notion never develops from metaphor to theory. In this respect it is much like the ordering of a history book by a dominant theme. Too often, what happens is that in explaining everything it predicts nothing. If one takes seriously the metaphor of a contest for prizes, the metaphor can be developed into a theory with some predictive power—at least to the extent that it has any real fit with the data.

There is no reason, to be sure, for anyone to look down on a common-sense and literary ordering of the mass of materials presented in this volume. The system of sorting the data has reduced it to an order that will permit others not only to get at a wide range of factual assertions and particular propositions, but in addition—by the very massing and juxtaposition of the data—to speculate about a range of interrelated hypotheses that can infuse the data with added meaning. It is a

¹ Draft of paper given at the Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association, November 22, 1958, 27 pages, mimeographed, p. 8.

pity that the problem of space so seriously curtailed the authors' ability to footnote and document their statements of fact. Often one does not know whether the authors are relying on their great personal knowledge or on some one or several of the works listed in their voluminous and impressive chapter bibliographies. Again, one can sympathize with the authors' difficulty in the face of the dearth of primary research. This is especially the case where, as in the chapter on the judiciary, it led them to footnote a rumor among lawyers in support of statements in the text. It is hard to decide how to handle the gaps in hard data particularly when these gaps mean important holes in the picture.

Propositions Not Explicit

It would have been helpful, if it had proved consistent with the authors' scheme and the space limitations of a book that must have seemed well-nigh endless, had the authors been willing to indicate what they considered to be their key hypotheses and propositions and the reasons they found persuasive for their adoption. Doubtless they felt this would be an act of condescension to the reader and an impolite reflection on his intelligence. One suspects, however, that this is a result of the literary convention that hides the bare bones of the skeleton of abstraction on which the body of description is fleshed out.

If the authors are modest in not advertising their hypothetical wares, the reader will find them with a little digging. Central to the authors' explanation of New York politics is the Charter Revision of 1901. This charter revision revealed what was to become the classic tactic of Republicans, independents, and reformers for successful participation in the city's politics—"state legislative investigation, charter revision from Albany, and Fusion in the City election." In Sayre and Kaufman's view, the Charter Revision of 1901 reduced the power of the Mayor, put him, so to speak, in "commission" in the newly designed and powerful Board of Estimate, and confirmed the party organizations as five county borough systems thereby precluding the growth of integrated city-wide organizations. However, if the Charter Revision of 1901 downgraded the Mayor and prevented the growth of city-wide party organizations, it had the effect of creating "borough politics" that in the authors'

view offers many contrasts to the "ward politics" of Chicago and Philadelphia. The borough leaders, because their constituencies are large and diverse and they must respond to wider forces than aldermen and ward leaders, "are more visible, more vulnerable, and in that sense, more responsible." The principal additional ingredient in New York's "unusual," though not unique, system is the retention of the parties and party leaders as principal actors in the contest. "The ambiguities and low visibility of non-partisan city government have, as a consequence, been largely avoided." Perhaps to Sayre's law concerning the Mayors of New York becoming Mayors of New York, we can add the Sayre and Kaufman law of political visibility: the more visible, the more vulnerable, the more responsible. If we only knew precisely what these terms meant we might have some first-rate advice for charter commissions anxious to avoid the evils, if they be evils, of ambiguities and ward politics.

The Open Political System

The following sentences give the reader a preview of what the authors think emerges from their labors as a characterization of the City's politics:

By constructing a system of borough politics, the charter commissions enabled the city to escape much of the parochialism and low visibility of a system of ward politics. And while many other forces in the life of the city have contributed to the nature of its political and governmental system, the commitment of a prominent role to parties and to party leaders, and to a system built around a few large boroughs rather than numerous small wards, has played a significant part in developing the main characteristics of New York City government and politics to be described in the following pages: a system of "open" politics, the absence of a single dominant ruling elite, a pattern of competition and bargaining from which no group is for long alienated or excluded, a system inherently conservative but not incapable of innovation. (p.17)

Certain dimensions emerge from this characterization which seem to give some quality and specificity to the government and politics of New York City. A prime dimension that the authors prize quite highly is one of "openness." No group, in their view, is permanently alienated from the politics of the city, none is powerless to make its presence felt and all

learn relatively rapidly how to work the system.

Unfortunately, for the person who wants to translate an assertion of openness into observables, there is not much to go on either by way of contrast with other cities or with New York's own past. This is partly due to the structure of the volume which has chosen to concentrate on five select groups of participants in the "contest" and their strategies and tactics rather than to follow any key issues through in detail and see in Lasswell's phrase, who got what, when, how. One is left with the happy feeling that New York's is a contest in which there are prizes for everybody, no stockings get coal and, while some get less than they want, they can all hope for more by and by. This points to the difficulty of not taking the contest for prizes metaphor more seriously for the official participants and the leaders of the non-governmental groups. We don't know how to score this contest even though we may know the names and numbers of all the players, which is itself somewhat doubtful.

The selection of the participants to be treated as parties to the contest and concentration on them somewhat exclusively vitiates the Truman-Bentleyan interest group conflict model which treats governmental actors as actual or virtual representatives of constellations of interests. While Sayre and Kaufman have done a superb job of delineating the core and satellite groups for a series of formal decision-making centers, there is a gap between the description of these centers and the underlying population. Thus, Puerto Ricans are footnoted once and Negroes four times. Perhaps, New York's is a politics with prizes but without issues. At any rate, those seeking to learn how the vexing problems of minorities are handled in New York in contrast with Chicago or Philadelphia will be hard put to do it.

Again the failure to deal with issues leaves one bewildered as to how a city that is both "open" and blessed or cursed with a multi-centered set of veto groups could build Lincoln Square and other public monuments ejecting thousands of people from their homes. This experience contrasts sharply with Myerson and Banfield's account of similar activities in Chicago. One is at a loss to know, are New Yorkers more docile or patriotic in accepting this kind of massive change than Chicagoans,

or is the Chicago system more sensitive to the protest of minorities, or must one regard Lincoln Square and its like as exceptions to the rule.

Another dimension that the authors develop is that between service-demanders and money-providers. The service-demanders are largely the low income groups, the Negroes and Puerto Ricans. They and their allies, the heads and chiefs of the agencies and certain non-governmental groups, overcome the powerful, but in this case, not all powerful opposition of the Comptroller, the Budget Director, the Board of Estimate, and the money-providers. Logic and the authors' account of the Board of Estimate, they admit, would lead those unfamiliar with New York politics to expect the Board and the status quo to prevail. That they do not does not invalidate the picture presented of the Board; it merely points to the alternative explanation, the system of "open" politics. One hopes that in the future work of the authors, they will not leave us hanging between logic and the facts.

Autonomous Bureaucracies Oppose Change

The most basic trend in New York has been toward a multi-centered system of increasingly autonomous decisional centers, resistant to integration and wedded to the status quo. The drive for autonomy has been powered largely by the search of the organized bureaucracies and their leaders to escape from the disturbing influences of the "movers and shakers" and to attain the joys of job protection and promotion from within. In this quest, they have been aided by the reformers, the civic groups, and the press. The twin slogans "keep out politics" and "keep out outside interests" have done yeoman service in creating self-contained islands of bureaucratic autonomy in which even the top management posts are reserved for promotion from within. The organized bureaucracies allied to the party leaders have a firm source of support in the Board of Estimate and can balk efforts of the Mayor and his Commissioner to innovate.

Authorities Source of Innovation

Thus, attempts to upgrade fire prevention founder on bureaucratic intransigence and Board of Estimate hostility to innovation. A price, however, is paid for the increasingly

inflexible and inadaptive structure that bureaucratic autonomy implies. When the Commissioner of Police could not produce traffic engineers and statisticians from the closed ranks of the police department hierarchy, the traffic function was lost to the Department. Sayre and Kaufman remark that if the politics of appointment was dominated by the parties at the turn of the century, they are now dominated by the organized bureaucracies and their interest group allies. This to the extent that, the authors state, the Mayor has little more control over his appointees than they have over theirs in their own departments. So far has this process of functional autonomy been carried that Sayre and Kaufman speak of democratic control through elected officials becoming a somewhat empty ritual.

The city, as a creature of state law, faces the problem of its agencies seeking and securing, or having imposed on them, independent legal status. In the Board of Health, this has created a virtually separate functional legislature. This isolation is not without costs, however, as the Health Commissioner discovered in the fight over fluoridation. The authors point, too, to the bruising experience of the organized teachers before the Board of Estimate as illustrating the costs, even to such a group, of ostentatious isolation from the city's politics.

Another force for fragmentation in the City's political life are the authorities created to escape the confining legal limits on the City's financial capacity to undertake program. If the independent authorities have been a source of fragmentation, they also have been a refreshing source of innovation in an ossifying set of status quo oriented bureaucracies. For reasons the authors do not discuss, the authorities seem to have escaped the deadening hand of bureaucratic job protectionism. This coupled with a built-in need to aggressively develop new programs has given them a dynamic role in the city's life. It is, perhaps, because of their freedom and dynamism that New York's Renaissance figure, Robert Moses, with his personal feudal empire is based among them. Apparently tolls, revenue bonds, and freedom to decide first and account afterwards are a significant base for innovation.

The parties seem to play a curious role. The textbooks speak of them as programmatic. In

Sayre and Kaufman's view, with perhaps the exception of the Liberal Party, they have no interest in issues except the election law. Their sole interest in life is party viability "winning the symbols and substance of party vitality in electing candidates to office." The parties are loosely organized borough affairs based on the assembly District. They are largely held together and motivated by the attraction of judicial spoils. This seems to be the one area of jobs that the reformers, the press, and the civil service have left to them. Through their chosen instrument, the Board of Estimate, the County Leaders and Assembly Leaders bargain with Mayor and Department Heads to secure accommodations to the pragmatic values represented by their view of party needs. It would be fascinating to see what underlying groups and values get represented through the party process. In general, Sayre and Kaufman characterize the party influence as conservative especially as constraining the impetuosity of the Mayor, who responds to a somewhat different constituency.

Attempts at Integration

The non-governmental groups in the city, with the exception of the press, the Citizens Union, and a few others, are narrowly concerned with a few functional areas. They revolve as satellites around the decision-making centers of officialdom that interest them as allies or adversaries. They find in the public meetings of the Board of Estimate a congenial and gratifying state. The Citizens Union and the press represent two of the protagonists of broad interests and of innovation. The authors find it surprising that there is so little in the way of substantial representation for general interests. The general interest is not quite nobody's interest but it has few powerful and articulate spokesmen. Is it surprising that this should be the case?

What indeed is the general interest and what is the problem of integration? The planners thought they knew and in the Charter of 1938, by what the authors called a kind of coup d'état, set up the planning commission as a kind of fourth power in the city government with a mandate to make the city rational, fit for philosopher kings. What could be gotten into a charter, however, couldn't be powered into political reality. Isolated from politics, viewed with hostility by the Board of

Estimate, and kept aloof from the support of the Mayor by its independence, the Commission has failed to realize the hopes put in it. It remains a testimonial to the civic bad conscience over the City's failure to plan.

Another integrative institution, one that was shorn of detail to be free to act on the big picture, has been swallowed by the Board of Estimate. The Council, despite a handful of important actions such as rent control and open occupancy, is a shadow. The Board of Estimate to all intents and purposes has become the all powerful upper house. In fact the Board of Estimate, in Sayre and Kaufman's view, is the center of gravity of the New York contest. It is the main arena and the most powerful institutional participant. The original intent that the Mayor, allied with two other city-wide elected officers, the Comptroller and the President of Council, should dominate the Board failed because the Mayor heads no unified city-wide party that would yield him control. Instead the Comptroller forms the head of a stable alliance with the Borough Presidents rivaling the power of the Mayor and bound together by "borough courtesy." The Mayor's entrance into the Board, as the authors point out, is a liability to him and an asset to the Board. Its tactics of delay, rule of unanimity, use of a line item detailed budget, and control of personnel give the Board the whiphand over the Mayor. In fact, the Mayor who most meets the authors' approval, LaGuardia, operated by boycotting the Board and denouncing some of its members. This may account for the power of that replica of LaGuardia, the one man the authors mention as not deferring to the Board, Moses. It may also account for, what the authors view as anomalous, their favorable judgment on Fusion government.

The Mayor and the Board of Estimates

The reluctant admiration of the authors yields a magnificent description of the Board: "The Board, like the party leaders and the bureaucracies, has an affinity for the *status quo*. Its dominant characteristic is its capacity to absorb, as if it were a great sponge, the constant stream of proposals for change which flow in upon the Board from the Mayor, from the commissioners of departments and agencies, from the nongovernmental groups and the communication media, from all those who

would like to be Mayor, and from all the other sources of dynamism in the city." (p. 650) The Board is, in their view, not in any sense a leader, an innovator, or even a conscious integrator in pursuing the particular goals of its members; however it somehow serves as an effective mechanism to accommodate, adopt and suppress the demands flowing in on it.

If the Board is, in a sense, the authors' villain among the participants in the contest, the Mayor is the hero albeit somewhat tragic or tragi-comic depending on one's point of view:

He is the central focus of responsibility and accountability for all that occurs in the city: he is the problem-solver, the crisis-handler, the man-to-blame for all the defects of the governing process in the city. Out of the diversity and the fragmentation, widespread autonomy and competition, separate islands of power, and numerous restrictions, he is called upon to bring unity and action. The expectations of the electorate, of the organized groups of all types, and especially of the communication media, center sharply upon the Mayor. His office is the most perceptible, the most impressive; it is taken for granted that he has the most power and thus the capacity to act vigorously in the solution of the city's problems great and small. Failure to meet these high expectations is taken to mean not lack of vigor in the office but in the man. (p. 657)

The lament over the disparity between the formal and actual powers of the American chief executive and the expectations of him by press and public is all too familiar. So familiar, in fact, that one wonders whether the imbalance of power and expectations is as unnatural as the lament makes it sound. Certainly it seems reasonable to believe that any system, political or other, if it is to be stable, must be fairly heavily weighted in favor of the status quo. While we may place a value on the system's capacity to adapt to change, we should probably recognize that this adaptation, for the most part, must be piecemeal and evolutionary. Integration may, at times, be the product of a chief executive reflecting a broad constituency and a range of interests not to be found elsewhere; by and large, however, integration will be found to be the product of history and the mesh of institutions developed in its course. The chief executive may symbolize a unity he cannot create and give a program emphasis and an innovative direction but little more. Is what seems pretentious and

unrealistic for a planning commission altogether different for a mayor, especially a mayor without a party?

Despite the authors' feeling of confidence that the government and politics of New York have performed well, both in the provision of services and in the open democratic quality of its civic life, they are beset with forebodings. They say: "Because the city's system is multi-centered, then, it harbors traits that may be serious risks to its own continued existence." (p. 720) Again, "The trends and tendencies are what count, and it is by no means certain that as the city and its social and economic life become more intensively specialized, and as the number of decision centers increases correspondingly, the dangers will not grow greater and the democratic features and flexibility of the system decline." (p. 725) One would like to have these risks specified in terms of observables that one could take a look at and think about. A most useful dimension for exploring the working of a system or order is the kind of problems that it cannot cope with or that disrupt it.

While the authors point to the growing complexity of the metropolitan area as expanding the arena of the contest, there is little in what they say to make it seem that they regard the so-called metropolitan problem as a menace. Their description of the well worked out patterns of accommodation and bargaining with state and federal governments provides little reason for fears from these quarters. In

fact, they testify to a dedication of the contestants to preserving the contest—the going system—as a matter of principle.

The authors' major recommendation for reform, the strengthening of the powers of the mayor, is clearly directed toward what they believe are the two great growing defects of the present system—increasing lack of integration and increasing resistance to innovation. What the economists call rigidities are developing in the political life of New York. These may seriously reduce its adaptive capacity to change. In what way the increasing, if it be increasing, lack of integration menaces the city's life is unspecified. Here again, comparisons might be useful. What cities do we know that have seriously suffered because their political system did a poor job of integration or because their political system resisted innovation.

The cities that are museum pieces met their fate in the economic realm. The Vernon studies of New York indicate that fate is a considerable ways off and that, given anything but disastrously bad government, not much to be feared.

Sayre and Kaufman have provided their colleagues and everyone interested in urban problems with a rich mine of material and a magnificent first approximation of a fabulously complicated political and social system. One hopes they will press on with a job well begun.

Anthropology and Comparative Administration

By WILLIAM B. STORM, University of Southern California

BIENNIAL REVIEW OF ANTHROPOLOGY 1959, edited by Bernard J. Siegel. Stanford University Press, 1959. Pp. 273. \$6.00.

THIS volume introduces a series which, the editor states, will attempt to keep anthropologists, preprofessionals in anthropology, and members of related disciplines abreast of relevant publications in the various fields of anthropology. The proposal is to present such a stock-taking every two or three years. The volume briefly describes and summarizes "the more noteworthy papers and monographs

published since 1955 in five fields of major current interest: social and cultural change, physical anthropology, linguistics, social organization and the psychological dimensions of culture." The fields covered are chosen on the basis of quantity of output during the period involved. Each field is presented by an outstanding person in that field. In addition to those mentioned, two special areas are reviewed—"Recent Trends in Soviet Anthropology," by Lawrence Krader, and "Political Anthropology," by David Easton.

Students of public administration are likely

to be most curious about the work of the anthropologists in two areas: cultural change and comparative administration. The first of these receives specific attention in this volume and, while some of the materials covered are applicable, the second is not specifically discussed.

Values and Culture Change

A shift in emphasis during the past two decades is noted in the study of culture change. A quarter-century ago the image of culture centered on *traits* as the unit of analysis, while today the emphasis appears to have shifted to structure and system. In the early period the study of cultural change was fragmented while currently it speaks of cultural *systems* and relates them to organisms. This is seen as a significant step in supplying a more useful model for analysis.

One of the more interesting sections on change deals with *values* and culture change. Values have only recently been associated with culture change by the anthropologists. Prior to 1953 there were only fourteen specific discussions of this relationship in the literature, the editor notes, while in the two-year period reviewed by this volume, 1957-1958, there were eleven studies which recognized values "as a primary factor in the dynamics of culture change." Cultures are seen as including value systems which are in effect quasi-elastic ways of thinking. A personality typology appears to rise from the value systems as part of the cultural situation.

For those of us who believe that culture supplies a basic frame of reference for the study of comparative administration, the work of the anthropologists may be somewhat disillusioning, as their work appears to supply relatively little grist. Comparative administration has been studied from a variety of dimensions, including that of culture per se.¹ It is disappointing to learn that little current anthropological writing is directly related to this study.

Culture and Administration

The familiar hypothesis of Mr. Benjamin

Whorf² to the effect that language and culture are products of each other and that thought patterns are the by-product of the two in interaction may be significant to students of comparative administration.³ The significance lies in the degree to which the relationship between culture and behavior is mechanistic. The writings of Ruth Benedict suggest that a high "mechanical factor" does exist, that people in different cultures do indeed think differently and do have a different world-view. The anthropologist Dorothy Lee declares, in essence, that values are premises of action, and she emphasizes that values are culture-based. In her mind, then, actions are offshoots of culture. Anthropologist Wayne Untereiner has described what he calls "ordering elements" which are thought or value patterns through which members of given cultures lend reality to their world. These are culturally based, he posits, and while they have some commonality they are, in their totality, distinctive.

Values thus appear to be a unit of behavioral measurement. Presumably, if one identifies the value pattern of a given culture with sufficient specificity, he can develop an instrument for estimating reactions to *change* stimuli in the form of innovation, competition, and interaction with variant values, for example. This instrument would be useful to students of comparative administration.

Programs, whether public or private, that generate administrative systems for their accomplishment become immediately involved with some of the fundamentals of the cultures in which they are set. Very often the program itself reflects culturally significant values, but in any case the administrative techniques used to achieve the program are based on values. Through the identification of pertinent values a predictive tool might be evolved, which would allow a fair estimate of the potential applicability and usefulness of a program, a management device or both.

To illustrate this, consider some of the values of the United States as against, for example, the Middle East. Presthus has made a general analysis of Middle Eastern values while Untereiner has made a specific evalua-

¹ See for example, Robert V. Presthus, "The Social Bases of Bureaucratic Organization," 38 *Social Forces* 103-109 (December, 1959) and Richard W. Gable, "Culture and Administration in Iran," 13 *The Middle East Journal* 407-421 (Autumn, 1959).

² See for example, Harry Hoiyer, "The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis," in *Language in Culture*, Harry Hoiyer, Editor (University of Chicago, 1954), pp. 92-105.

³ Seigel, p. 195.

tion of Iranian values.⁴ Various behavioral scientists, Kluckhohn for example, have discussed American values. A personality type, or what Presthus calls the modal personality, rises from these value patterns.

American and Middle Eastern Value Patterns

Americans are seen as being characterized by some of the qualities briefly noted in the following paragraph. Note that these are intimately related to both program and process in American administration.

The equalitarian tradition is ingrained in Americans who feel that all are basically equal and that anyone can rise to the top. Americans are preoccupied with material things and are optimistic about life, living, and the future. Organization life, which dominates society in the United States, is characterized by group participation, teamwork, and self-disciplined, lawful behavior. Americans have a worldly religious view where the supreme being is associated with love, kindness, and tolerance for human weakness. They believe that almost everyone will go to heaven especially if they have worked hard and have been materially successful. Americans are suspicious of intellectual activity, respect specialized, practical knowledge, believe in the concept of merit and are highly social in an impersonal way. Finally, they are "other-directed" and given to conformity, in spite of their highly idealized and verbalized belief in individualism.

Now let us consider the Middle Eastern man as Presthus, Untereiner and Gable describe him. His thought processes are more *subjective* than *objective*. Decisions are affected by such personal criteria as family, status, and education rather than the facts which bear directly upon the situation. His "other-worldly" religion grossly inhibits his action in a variety of contexts. Middle Eastern man is pessimistic, he doubts that much can be done to improve the world and he believes that certainly *he himself* cannot expect to do much. He does not believe his world will change much and as a result he is inclined to react negatively to change stimuli. In this context, technical change is often viewed with

scorn because it implies material improvement in a situation which especially values non-material qualities.

In education, the Middle Eastern scholar learns a lot of information but he does not learn to think. Education is more a matter of status than preparation. Middle Eastern cultures are such that there is a marked lack of community spirit and a tendency to go it alone, depending largely upon family and friends rather than outsiders. The dependence the individual feels as a result of the lack of governmental protections tends toward the development of subservience patterns. There is marked personal insecurity and individual behavior is often characterized by fear. In any formal relationship there is a distinct breakdown on a dominance-submission basis. Interpersonal relations have a Machiavellian quality and are often vicious.

In personal traits, Untereiner and Gable term the Persians individualistic, subjective and tradition-bound. The individualism of Persians is manifested by the absence of a sense of community. People do not think in team or cooperation terms. The subjective quality shows in many Persian thought processes. Ideas are expressed in diffuse ways; decisions rest upon tradition; logical ordering of pertinent factors is not general. Traditionalism simply reduces the opportunity to innovate, either in thought or practice. Typical Iranians have real difficulty thinking about their own future or the future of their interests. A fatalistic quality leads to the assumption that the future is ordained and nothing can be done about it.

Effects of Culture Differences

There are two aspects of these cultural differences which are of interest to students of public administration. On the one hand, such differences lead to broad variation in the interpretation of the role of government and in the types of public programs developed. On the other hand, they lead to a very sharp and real difference in human behavior in the administration of the public programs offered.

This implies that if we had more precise knowledge of the value patterns of different cultures we could make reasonably specific estimates of the type of administrative programs such cultures would be likely to accept. In addition, we would be able to determine

⁴ Presthus, *op. cit.*, and Wayne Untereiner, *The Administrative Environment of Iran* (mimeographed). (University of Southern California, 1954.) Professor Leonard Binder's studies on the bureaucracy of Iran support Untereiner's analysis.

the bureaucratic patterns which would probably take root in the cultures and the attendant forms of managerial and organizational behavior. Research could then be more scientific, based upon testable hypotheses and executed in terms of empirical tests of these hypotheses. We would, in effect, be able to develop empirically tested knowledge about why people do what they do rather than concentrating simply on descriptions of what they do.

Consider the development of a civil service system in the U. S. as against a Middle Eastern country, for example. American concern for values such as equality, democracy, organized activity, competition, fair play, and merit make a controlled, organized system, dedicated to equality of entry opportunity and to equal pay for equal work a logical goal. In the Middle East, value patterns of elitism, paternalism, autocracy, social rank, kinship ties, and pessimism make such an institution difficult if not impossible to achieve. In the Middle Eastern mind, it is logical and right to depend upon friends, nepotism, and what we would classify as the devious maneuver to get ahead.

Similarly, in the United States it is reasonable to institute programs wherein management practice involves participation, teamwork, cooperation, and conscious self-discipline because these qualities are in the culture. Americans think in terms of them. A highly decentralized pattern of management is becoming characteristic in the United States, both in government and business. We can anticipate that these will work because the value and behavior pattern suggests they will. On the other hand, it is unlikely that such management technique will work in the Middle East—or if it does it will only be through culture change.

In many matters of intense concern to students of administration, differences based upon what surely must be culturally set values are clearly identifiable. Attitudes toward authority, organizational power structures, control techniques, leadership dynamics, planning and decision patterns, communication

practices and many other qualities imply a different *type* of managerial and organizational behavior in the United States as against the Middle East. The difference appears to be the result of different world views, different thought patterns, and different values, all of which are factors of culture.

Need for Study of National Cultures

This makes it doubly disappointing that the anthropologists are doing so little in this area. One could hope that their studies would give a clearer insight into national character and behavior than is now the case. They do give this type of insight into certain exotic tribes, but they have been wary of coming to grips with highly complex cultures. This is not to ignore the attempts that have been made to capture national character in such countries as Germany, Russia, Japan and the United States. Nevertheless, the anthropologists themselves have not been happy with the results. In part this is because it has proved exceedingly difficult to precisely identify and describe world view, thought patterns, and values and to generalize such findings for an entire culture. Consequently, such studies have tended to the superficial and reliability, in terms of predicting response to introducing innovations into the culture, has been questionable. Students of comparative administration would value studies in depth made of Russian, British, Chinese, German and other of the more complex cultures. From an identification of world view, thought patterns, and values, hypotheses could be drawn about organization behavior, bureaucratic characteristics, management techniques, and forms of public programs which would fit the situation. Research could then be specifically focused.

To do this sort of thing, the student of comparative administration will need far more specific information on human culture and on culture change than is now available to him. In this regard, the anthropologists appear to be moving in a direction which does not seem specifically useful to students of administration.

Psychiatrists as Administrators

By WILLIAM GORE, University of Kansas

ADMINISTRATION OF THE PUBLIC PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL, by the Committee on Hospitals. Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, 1960. Pp. 199. \$1.00.

THIS report contains several surprises. Although formulated by a committee, it has much of the literary unity of single authorship. And, although formulated by a committee of psychiatrists, it somehow avoids reliance upon the jargon of psychiatry. Actually it was formulated by a committee of psychiatrist administrators and their position on several important administrative issues is very different from what those who identify the clinically-oriented with a soft approach would expect.

At a time when we are frequently told that people are the only things that count, a committee of men who make a profession out of dealing with troubled individuals suggest that "Formal organization . . . is . . . a framework for the distribution of administrative authority throughout the hospital. The reciprocal relationships, set up to make action for hospital purposes possible, should be made explicit in writing . . . [Formal organization] charts and diagrams [though they can be misleading] serve the purpose of letting people know where they stand." (p. 152) Proponents of formal organization have been preaching precisely this point of view for years but of late they have become used to being told that letting people know where they stand is not permissive. Many a seasoned administrator would find this conception of authority consistent with his own. "Authority rests upon the need for order in any organization of effort. . . . It rests in the last analysis upon the invocation of sanctions and, in the event of disobedience, upon an immediately operational system of punishment (as well as of rewards)." (p. 126) In the light of current doctrine this would be seen by many as rigid, ritualistic and—worst of all—undemocratic. That it comes from a committee of "100% people oriented" professionals may be a source of mild jubilation in some quarters.

Successful Administration

Administration plays an important role in achieving effectiveness in the hospital. The committee holds that many of the unfortunate results of organizational effort stem from faulty administration rather than from inappropriate methods of treatment or incorrect diagnosis. What is this ingredient so critical to effecting treatment? "Successful administration is the creation of an environment—of an appropriate physical setting, of a favorable psychological climate, and of an established pattern for interpersonal relationships required for the efficient discharge of an organization's functions." (p. 123) Further, successful administration "... enables a group of qualified people to contribute toward socially valued purposes . . . with resultant personal satisfaction, growth and fulfillment." (128) But this environment is only a little wheel which makes the big wheel go. "[The result of a favorable environment is dedication], a zestful, rationally-approved involvement in a common task, consciously preferred to any other." (p. 129)

Administrators seek to create and maintain an environment which generates and continuously regenerates dedication by carrying through a sequence of three integrated processes, over and over again. By analyzing goals administrators identify from among all that could be done those things which are most worth doing. Analysis of the organization as a social system points up those activities which promote and those which threaten goals. From this step the administrator derives a strategy for reaching organizational goals. Thirdly, administrators must define tactics that will induce concrete changes in activity, which, when accumulated, will bring organizational activities inconsistent with goals into harmony with goals through a series of relatively inoffensive incremental changes.

Anyone who has felt the burden of the do-nothing imperative implicit in much of what has been said about leadership since permissiveness came into vogue will find this rewarding reading. Denying at the same time the passive, socially responsive leader and the

"big man, big change" type, the authors reject the management or control oriented bureaucratic type as well. In a quietly bold stroke, the authors hold that the true concern of the administrator is the identification and implementation of change; that the highest administrative talent is the vision to see the promise of the future and the courage to reach for it. This sort of thing has been said before but seldom by men who are so fully aware of what they are saying and almost never in such unequivocal terms by men who are participants in the bureaucratic endeavor.

Yet there is much not said here one might have hoped men with the unique perspective of the psychiatric administrator might have said. As recently as eighty years ago both administration (as the institutionalization of the leadership function) and psychiatry were unknown. We were equally ignorant of the inner dynamics of human organization and of the human mind. Both were born of separate marriages of convenience outside the legitimizing limits of an established profession; both came of age during and after World War I and, today, represent some of the most crucial skills in contemporary society. And yet, though they have grown, in fact outgrown themselves two or three times, both psychiatry and administration face major unresolved problems.

Some Unresolved Problems

In the public psychiatric hospital some of these difficulties are interwoven in a single issue. If the goal of the hospital is treatment of mental illness, how much improvement is recovery? Such an issue throws into relief both the ideological relativity of goals which plagues the conscientious administrator and the moral relativity of therapy (society has the right to expect the patient to accept responsibility for himself as soon as possible but the individual has the right to expect help in regaining contact with the whole of life) which plagues the psychiatrist, especially the dedicated psychiatrist. However, this is an example of a more immediate issue than can be dealt with more or less satisfactorily over a period of time.

Administrators, as specialists in the intricacies of effective collective action, and psychiatrists, as specialists in effective individual action, carry a special responsibility in a

society whose future is dependent on the initiative of healthy, self-identified personalities and whose present is dependent upon more effective harnessing of individuals in collective activity. Every acute administrator knows that bureaucratic organizations set individual against individual in a simmering conflict that siphons off much of our creative energy (and with it the ability to adapt and accommodate) as well as some of our productive energy. Someone has said the organization hasn't been made yet which does not burn up half its pulling power between the motor and the rear axle.

At the same time the psychiatrist sees organization turning man against himself, making normal personalities into neurotics and neurotics into identity-less chameleons robbed of some of the essentials of human dignity. It can be maintained that this is only a necessary cost of existence in our times. Over the centuries this may have been true, but a third development, mirrored in the emergence of psychiatry and administration, the maturation of social science, may have placed new and more powerful tools in our hands. In this context it is irrelevant whether Freud was or was not preoccupied with sex or whether dream analysis is or is not a reliable source of information about the subconscious. Freud's systematic analysis of the subconscious demonstrated that the mind is not a dumb reflection of supernatural forces, or fate, or whatever, but is a reflection of its experiences and the beliefs and values it accepts as a consequence and under favorable circumstances can change itself.

In the same way, in their Western Electric study, one of those focal studies by which science redirects thought into new channels, Rothlesberger and Dickson demonstrated that people have powerful motives which can be unlocked through leadership. Lewin and others demonstrated that leadership consistent with the variability between individuals is more effective than other types. The list could be extended many times to provide overwhelming evidence that social science makes available a body of knowledge that may lead to the discovery or creation of patterns of interpersonal relations which in turn may lead to unbelievable productive efficiency and a kind of creative adaptability unknown in

contemporary organization: patterns of interpersonal relations that will facilitate instead of stifle the development of healthy personalities. Social science has made modern bureaucracy obsolete.

Therefore, some of the unresolved problems blocking the growth of effective organizations in modern society are administrative relating to the goals, strategy, and tactics of

organization action and some are problems related to developing an environment that contributes to the growth of healthy personalities able to maintain the constructive interpersonal relations necessary to achieve the ends of organization. Given the psychiatric administrator's strategic position astride these two pivotal fields one cannot help but look to him with expectation.

Administrators in Education

By JOHN J. THEOBALD, Board of Education of the City of New York

PROFESSIONAL ADMINISTRATORS FOR AMERICA'S SCHOOLS, by American Association of School Administrators. Library of Congress, 1960. Pp. 310. \$5.00.

IN the true sense *Professional Administrators for America's Schools* is not a book, it is a report. It is an attempt on the part of a committee of distinguished educational leaders and administrators to evaluate their profession's own practices and standards in the preparation and selection of school superintendents.

As might be expected in such an attempt there is a strong concern for the matter of professional status running through the report. It is, however, a concept of "earned rather than learned" prestige and does a reasonably good job of keeping attention focused on the impact of administrative performance on the education of boys and girls. In many respects it is the kind of report which could have been written by a similar committee of the American Society for Public Administration. It is a volume well worth the close scrutiny of administrators from both groups.

The first few chapters go into some detail concerning the selection of a school superintendent, how it's done today, what the issues are that come before a board as it seeks the right man, what an average school superintendent is like in terms of his experience, preparation, and personal qualities, and the way he is trained for the job today.

The true-life story of the selection of fictitious Mr. Smith for the superintendency of fictitious Riverdale is a provocative piece of

reading—especially that section which deals with the board's decision.

One board member is quoted as saying: "... frankly we're looking for a right-minded guy"; another, "We want a superintendent who is neither tainted with a Bestor brush nor given to bursts of radicalism." The entire board was quite specific in wanting a superintendent who talked more about education and curriculum than about money and buildings.

Clearly this was a stable, well-to-do community that had no pressing problems other than maintaining and improving the education program. It is doubtful that any of its neighborhoods were in transition ethnically, that there was a serious shortage of teachers or school buildings, or that there were long standing professional conflicts. To one who has served in a large city system, it sounds like Utopia in educational administration and points up the fact that the criteria for selection of superintendents differ greatly in proportion to the differences among the towns, cities, and school districts that seek leaders for their schools.

In spite of the striking differences among administrative problems, however, it seems clear that there should be a common core of knowledge, techniques, and experiences that all administrators should have. Chapter IV on the present professional preparation of school administrators deals with this question and concludes bluntly with the observation that the preparation of school superintendents is badly in need of complete overhauling.

Typical Committee Findings and Recommendations

Several of the extracts from what it calls "the accruing evidence of the theorists" illustrate the tone of the committee's findings and recommendations. The following are typical:

1. Talcott Parsons, sociologist at Harvard, states that decision making is not the absolute function of the executive. Veto, yes, but not decision. The technical expert (in our case the teacher) participates in the decision. He does not merely display alternatives for executive action. He is involved, responsible, he shares in the consequences. The executive is powerless to implement without the skills of the technician. He can only fire one expert and hire another.

5. Walter Crewson, associate commissioner in the New York State Department of Education, has stated recently, "The superintendent was originally viewed as a fine scholar, a man of letters, and a gentleman. As he evolved and groped toward maturity, the superintendent came to be seen as a local leader in educational matters—a wise judge of good education—a supervisor of teachers. As it became apparent that good schools depended critically upon community leadership, the superintendent began to emerge as a community leader, a local educational statesman. . . . (birth rates, more classrooms, tax rates) tended to divert and indeed to fragment the superintendent. Small wonder, then, that the local superintendency came to be a synthesis of salesmanship and managerial skills, to the corresponding exclusion and neglect of . . . instructional leader. . . ."

7. Referring again to Thompson: "Much has been written about the uses of theory in research, less about the potential contributions of theory to the training of future administrators. In my opinion, an adequate theory of administration would go a long way toward preparing students for change. . . . We cannot expect techniques of administration for 1977 to have much resemblance to those current today." He continues: ". . . an adequate theory of administration might . . . allow the administrator to incorporate knowledge produced by the several disciplines. . . . Many administrators have responded to new situations, new conditions, and new opportunities by adjusting or adapting their behavior. These responses have not always been consistent or successful, but could we expect otherwise when administrators are forced to rely on hunch and ingenuity, trial and error? These are expensive tools."

11. As a final extract from the literature, let us examine Dan Griffiths' definition of theory in school administration: "A good theory exists when

there has been established a set of principles upon which action may be predicted. These principles . . . constitute a logical and consistent whole built about a single theme or a small number of themes. . . . As yet, there is no theory of administrative behavior which satisfies this definition. . . . A list of principles is not necessarily a theory. . . . A theory attempts to state in one general form the results of the observations of many different researchers. . . . A theory starts with [scientific] observations which have been made. . . . The observations must be in the form of facts." (pp. 103-106)

Committee Views

The most severe criticism of present programs of preparation has very broad implications and cannot be considered to apply to school administration alone. It comes as a quote from Alfred North Whitehead's *The Aims of Education and Other Essays*.

First-hand knowledge is the ultimate basis of intellectual life. To a large extent book-learning conveys second-hand information, and as such can never rise to the importance of immediate practice. . . . What the learned world tends to offer is one second-hand scrap of information illustrating ideas derived from another second-hand scrap of information. The second-handedness of the learned world is the secret of its mediocrity. It is tame because it has never been scared by facts.

The AASA apparently agrees with this quote and concludes that if "an institution cannot provide internship training, it should not be in the business of preparing educational administrators."¹

The general attitude of the commission is well summarized in the following quote: "It is the contention of this Commission that of all the many areas of knowledge in which a school administrator needs to keep up to date the most crucial, at the present time, is knowledge of administrative theory . . . [which] is still in an early developmental stage." (p. 99) Further, it is stated that "empirical administrative processes must give way to theory, and that we must not only be amenable to change, but that we must be its champions."

If there seems to be a contradiction between the "facts that scare" in one chapter and the emphasis on theory in the next, it's more apparent than real. Both theories and facts can jolt people into becoming sound administra-

¹ (Macmillan Company, 1929), p. 61.

tors or convince them that they should change their jobs.

The chapter entitled "The Changing Nature of Administration" is an essay in itself and, it seems to me, should be reprinted in pamphlet form for wider distribution. It might well be entitled "One Head is Not Enough," for it points out most forcefully, even though inadvertently, the need in modern administration to organize, deputize, and supervise. It might serve as a deterrent to some who want now to become administrators, but it would also attract more venturesome folk who may have in the past equated tedium with administration.

Identifying and Recruiting School Administrators

The second half of the book deals with identifying and recruiting the best candidates for school administrative posts, preparing them to become good administrators, and outlining ways how they can become better on the job, even though, as it states, the recommendations made here "cannot possibly be realized at present levels of (financial) support."

Frankly recognizing that a "substantial proportion of the colleges and universities now conducting preparation programs" have neither the resources nor the proper intent, since "some have been seduced by short-term motives that run counter to the best interests of American society," the writers discuss the problems of "getting these institutions out of the business of preparing administrators." In other words, the plea is made for much stricter professional controls aimed at certification or registration on some wide authoritarian base. Methods of control used in other professions such as law, medicine and dentistry are touched on in the final chapter and possible parallels are drawn between these and school administration. It is recognized, however, that doctors become doctors or dentists become dentists when they fulfill specified requirements, whereas a superintendent is not a superintendent until a board of education names him. This is an added obstacle to real professional control that the AASA writers cannot quite surmount, although they hopefully look forward to a time when boards of education will accept greater guidance from

the profession in the selection of top school administrators.

The appendix will delight the lover of the recondite.

Educational Administrators and Public Administrators

It is my personal belief that there is a core of knowledge and techniques common to both the school and the public administrator. If this is correct, then schools of educational administration and schools of public administration are or should be teaching some of the same things at the same time in different places. At a time of shortage of expert teachers of administration in both fields, it would seem clear that some form of coordinated effort should be the order of the day.

No True Generalists

On the other hand, I do not believe that *top* administrators, either educational or public, are truly generalists—interchangeable with one another. Of course, there are always a few people who are so far above the average that they cannot be used as examples for the rest. Sir Isaac Newton, for instance, possibly the greatest scientist of all time, was almost a caricature of genius at work. He did his best work alone in his rooms at Cambridge; forgot to eat in his concentration on scientific theory; and, at times when called downstairs for supper, he'd forget where he was going until he had gone by the dining room, through the front door, and out onto the street. Then, at times, he'd turn around, return directly to his room, and skip eating entirely. Yet, when England debased her coinage in 1696 and a strong, honest administrator was needed as Warden of the Mint, Newton distinguished himself as a public administrator, giving up scientific research at that period because he felt he "ought to be about the King's business."

Even including men like Sir Isaac, it seems to me that a good administrator must be well grounded in the facts, mores, and philosophies of the area which he administers. He usually gets this by serving in the ranks—in that or a related area—before taking on supervisory responsibilities. Theoretically, I should still think that the very best administrators, whether public or educational, could be interchanged after intensive re-orientation toward

the new job. But, the fact is, orientation for the educational assignment is a relatively lengthy job because of the many professional education aspects involved.

Free Interchangeability Difficult

An administrator in public education must inadvertently encounter many of the problems of public administration. However, unless a public administrator has had comparable experience in education, he should have greater difficulty fitting into the job of school superintendent than a school superintendent would have in fitting into the job of public administration. I think the question of size is also a most pertinent one in this respect. The superintendent of schools in the small community will require less skill as an administrator than as an educator. In a large city, the problems of administration may well become so complex as to absorb almost all of a superintendent's time, leaving the educational problems and decisions to a high ranking associate. Even here, however, I should hate to think that a person well versed in both backgrounds could not be found. Frankly, in terms of principle, I would feel similarly, but to varying degrees, about the top administrators in police, fire, hospitals, public works and the rest. Basically, our best administrators are likely to be generalists with a specialty.

In New York City the problem of choice between educational administrators and public administrators will never be a pressing one because there is room and need for both. We have a Bureau of Supplies, for instance, that is under a superintendent who has an engineering degree. There are 316 employees in Supplies, accounting for a payroll of about one million dollars a year, and expending approximately 20 million a year in purchases.

The Bureau of School Lunches is under a man whose experience includes private industry and direction of food service at the Pentagon during World War II, and who now operates the school lunch program of New York City public schools, involving an opera-

tion exceeding \$25 million a year. He considers himself a specialist yet he could administer any feeding service under private or public auspices any place in the country. To this extent, he's a generalist, cutting across administrative lines of public and educational activities.

On the other hand, our Associate Superintendent, in charge of the 596 elementary schools in New York City, must make his decisions on the basis of his knowledge of personnel, budgetary limitations, child and educational psychology, and public reaction. I can't see any public administrator taking over his job, although the Associate Superintendent, because of additional exposures, might conceivably turn in a good performance on a number of jobs in public administration.

Selecting Top Administrators

It is pertinent to the problem of selecting top administrators that there is the divergence in viewpoint between the career-insider and the career-outsider—one coming up from the ranks inside the system; the other coming from another school system or from some job disparate from education. Although the latter represents new blood, the former doesn't necessarily have tired blood. The latter has to win acceptance and loyalty; the former usually has already won such support. The latter has to learn a lot from scratch if he's to deploy his resources wisely; the former may know too much already.

If an "outsider" is appointed, he will need detailed briefing on every aspect of the job before assuming full responsibilities and he should be placed in a position where he has the closest kind of contact with some few well-informed insiders who know the pitfalls, who have no axes to grind, and who preferably were looking for the job in the first place.

The more demanding, the more complex, and the wider the administrative responsibilities, the greater the need for a generalist. In the last analysis, in a complex situation the general is only as good as his staff.

Social Work and Administration

By HAROLD E. SIMMONS, California State Department of Social Welfare

THE ADMINISTRATION METHOD IN SOCIAL WORK EDUCATION, by Sue Spencer. Council on Social Work Education, 1959. Pp. 75. \$2.50.

THIS publication is a part of the thirteen-volume Social Work Curriculum Study conducted by the Council on Social Work Education and directed by Dr. Werner W. Boehm, a professor of Social Work from the University of Minnesota. This Curriculum Study was recommended by an earlier, less comprehensive study in 1951.¹ The present study consisted of twelve separate projects, some of which received extensive analysis while others were less comprehensively developed by part-time directors. The research done in each of the projects was developed within the framework of a master design, but varied within certain limits between projects. Each project director assumed responsibility for results in each of the projects.

The primary objective of the administrative study, by Sue Spencer, was to determine educational objectives for the social work curriculum in the field of administration. The study staff acknowledged that the achievement of such objectives would first require the development of an understanding of the nature of administration in social welfare. The study further sought the clarification of educational content for social work administration as differentiated from social work education in general. Finally, the study considered the necessity to establish a framework in the social welfare curriculum which would achieve administrative educational objectives.

The study method was admittedly limited in scope because of the limitation of funds for this portion of the total curriculum study. In essence, the study method consisted of a review of literature, the development by the project director of a framework of assumptions and hypotheses, and, finally, testing this framework by soliciting written and oral comments from authorities in the field.

¹ Ernest V. Hollis and Alice L. Taylor. *Social Work Education in the United States: the Report of a study made for the National Council on Social Work Education* (Columbia University Press, 1951).

Community Organization, Group Work, and Administration

The administration study began in May of 1957, almost two years after the general study was launched. It is unfortunate that the administration study was directed with part-time staff in the briefest period of time of all the study projects. Had this project been conceived, staffed, and integrated within the overall project in its initial developmental stages, it is possible that it would have been treated differently. In this connection, Dr. Boehm commented in Volume I of the Curriculum Study: "The findings of the administration and community organization projects, in particular, suggest that there are sufficient common elements in these two methods to warrant teaching the educational objectives of these two methods in one sequence."² Similarly, Sue Spencer in this report on administration comments on the common nature of community organization and administration—each being separate projects in the curriculum study. She states that community organization practice represents a component in all social agency administration, since the agency must relate its goals and services to community forces and groups. The author further suggests that perhaps one-half to two-thirds of the substantive knowledge in social work administration and community organization is held in common and that the social policy activity is a function of both. It is difficult to conceptualize this issue. Is community organization a method or is it, rather, an administrative goal which utilizes casework, group work, and administrative principles and concepts to achieve its purpose? If it is an administrative goal, then group work could become a primary technical skill. If the approach that community organization is an administrative goal were accepted, its impact on curriculum development might possibly differ from the impact of the approach implicit in the author's rationale.

The author recognizes that both commu-

² Werner W. Boehm, *Objectives of the Social Work Curriculum of the Future* (Council of Social Work Education, 1959), p. 89.

nity organization and administration contain method components which, when merged, will offer a richness to the administrative curriculum. Moreover, if this reviewer's suggestion that the group work method form a basic method for this field, then that method must have its focus broadened, which would further enrich the curriculum.

Thus, these three separate study projects—group work, community organization, and administration might well have had some kind of treatment which sorted out common elements. There is nothing wrong with separate projects as such, but it is necessary to question the apparent lack of coordination between the three and the fact that too little work was done on the identification of common elements contained in these three project areas.

Not Integrated with the Other Studies

In Volume I of the thirteen-volume Curriculum Study, Dr. Boehm discusses the master design of the curriculum study which must be understood to more fully understand the administration project which is reviewed here. Two instruments were developed: a position statement on the nature of social work, and another statement on the nature of social work education. While the first of these two instruments was not completed until November 1957 (over two years after the study began), it was intended for use by all study projects. In order to make proper connections between the over-all curriculum study objectives and this one on administration, Miss Spencer appropriately identifies in her study the three goal functions of social work presented by Professor Boehm in Volume I as follows: a. restoration of impaired social functioning; b. provision of resources—social and individual—for more effective social functioning; and, c. prevention of social dysfunction. These phrases are identified, stated, but not integrated, in the administrative study—not connected one to the other as would be expected in a discussion of the nature of social work and the administration of social work.

In Volume I of the Curriculum Study, Dr. Boehm proposes a modification of current practices in social work education. He proposed to substitute an undergraduate-graduate continuum (a five year course) for the present six years, plus a kind of internship for a year following. A major recommendation in Miss

Spencer's study is the continuation of the traditional six-year course with no mention of the general study position on this issue. This is a central issue in the development of mature social work administrators and could well have received comprehensive, analytical treatment in this publication. If the administrative educational course length should differ from the over-all study recommendations, this difference should have been identified and discussed.

Staffing—a review of methods of dividing up the work—is a proper administrative concern. In Volume I of the Curriculum Study, Dr. Boehm appropriately identified this as an important issue and discussed it, yet the administrative study makes no reference to it. We often hear reference made to the small percentage of social workers with training and impossibility of schools of social work ever catching up with need. Yet we know that when tasks are sorted out, classified, and assigned to staff members with skills appropriate to the task, the number of highly skilled social workers required will be greatly reduced. This is particularly pertinent to public social services and to curriculum development. This fact was also noted in the curriculum study volume dealing with public social services. Similarly, the issue was identified and the term, "social work associate," is found in Volume II which discusses *The Place of the Undergraduate Curriculum in Social Work Education*.

Some professional social work problems were cited in this volume on administrative methods. The point was made that the Council on Social Work Education requires the incorporation of theory and practice in administration as a social work method in the required curriculum in all master's degree programs. With this background, it was noted that leading practitioners are generally unaware of school curricula changes in the past decade and that there is no well established channel of communication between schools of social work and social work executives. While these problems were not discussed in detail in the study, the unsupported statements enable us, from our individual experiences, to fill in and validate these assertions. Further, we sense a kind of universality in this communication problem in its application to other fields.

Generalist Versus Specialist

The administrative study develops eleven attributes which are thought to be common to all administration. The study speaks briefly to the issue of generic administration, but concludes that the performance of any service must include both technical and administrative judgment. The study correctly infers that social welfare has some of the technical skill and not enough of the administrative skill. This is an issue of paramount importance to the field of social work and to curriculum development. The public image of social welfare does not generally reflect social workers as administrators, particularly of large scale multi-million-dollar public welfare operations. How often have we heard that the hardfisted business administrator would be preferable as an administrator of such an agency. The study suggests that under an administrator trained in business, policy decisions may be opposed to the goals, values and methods essential to the professional practice of social work. I would add that the "generic" non-social work administrator often cannot exercise imaginative leadership in the development of different goals which may be required by new scientific developments in a technical field. Moreover, the generic administrator generally does not have the security which comes from integrated technical knowledge to strongly defend his program when under attack, or to develop a strong counter attack. In fact, many such administrators may entertain beliefs similar to those attacking—beliefs which are often based on tradition, folklore, superstition—and use such public criticism to rationalize changes which couldn't have been made in normal times because of technical staff resistance.

This discussion illustrates the point that this is a controversial, unresolved issue in the field of social welfare today and could appropriately have received fuller treatment even in this capsulized publication. It is an issue which becomes impelling in terms of fuller development of social work educational goals in administration.

Human Relations Skills Not Applied

The publication's discussion of the role of the executive considers administration as a process which concerns itself with the motiva-

tion of people toward the achievement of agency purpose. Historical mechanistic approaches to administrative problems, particularly those concerned with human behavior, are giving way to enlightened humanistic ones. The study notes the failure of social work to put its knowledge of human behavior and human relations to work in the administrative area. This failure is of consequence to the entire subject under discussion. Basic principles associated with human behavior have been developed in the field of social welfare to enable caseworkers to understand, to treat, and to motivate people with compassion and objectivity. Moreover, social welfare has particularly refined principles and methods involving the relationships of people, one to the other, through the casework process and the social group worker seeking human growth and development through the group process. The administrative process involves people associating together in a structured framework, working toward a common organizational goal. People are motivated similarly whether in or out of an administrative setting. In the administrative organism communication, authority, hierarchical structure, status, role, motivation and purposeful functioning, all require understanding of human behavior. Nonsocial work research in this area is developing some new directions in administration which take this knowledge of human behavior into account. We hear the term "depth interview"; we note that money is no longer viewed as the sole motivator; that authoritative rule is being modified; and that psychologists are employed by business for a variety of reasons. The fact that social work has made little, if any, contribution to the field of administration, in general, is understandable. That social work itself has made too little connection between its basic knowledge of human behavior and its application to social welfare administration is unfortunate. This curriculum study identifies this central issue and then expresses a proper concern that "... unless social workers have the knowledge and skill necessary to provide administrative leadership and direction to the social service programs in which they practice, social work will be looked upon by the public either as a sub-professional service or as merely a useful service operating as an aid to that of another profession." (p. 12)

The study develops certain propositions which recognize that a considerable part of social work practice is carried out at the executive or subexecutive level; that administrative practice is an additional body of knowledge and skill from that of the social caseworker. These propositions develop the thesis that the master's program should provide knowledge and experience as a foundation stone for later on-the-job training. The graduating student would not be expected to go directly to an executive position, although a curriculum could be developed for experienced students for such direct entry as executive upon graduation.

Social Work Training Gives Headstart

The distinctive feature of social work is that its special techniques, which characterize it as a profession, contribute to the administrative skill itself. Thus, the new social worker gains out of case or group work practice in an administrative setting a maturation which integrates theory with practice. Alton Linford stated in a position paper prepared for this study, that the practice of casework or group work may be used as a proper foundation, after a few years' practice, for the practitioner to guide himself to managerial or executive roles. It is true in this profession, more than most others, that the possibility of maturation of the practitioner from practice to administration is possible as a part of a continuum. This will be particularly possible if theory and field work in the master's program make early connections between human behavior in general and human behavior in administration. I would caution other business and professional groups, however, that this same principle would be less likely to apply unless the other profession was similarly associated with foundation work in the social and behavioral sciences. Finally, movement from case practice with its narrower focus (and often specialization), to administration, which requires a broader focus and orientation, requires much self-discipline and awareness. It does not come naturally in any field. The study's suggestion that schools consider administrative specialization for experienced social work practitioners to assist in making appropriate connections between practice and administration requires careful attention.

The chapter on analysis of administrative

content, essential for all social work students, provides a chart entitled "Application of Foundation Knowledge in the Learning of Social Work Administration." This chart lines up conceptual areas and their application in administration. A second chart lists content, familiarity, and skill in administration required for all social work students. The method of charting the relationships between basic concepts and their application in administration is both intriguing and appropriate. In fact, it represents a basic and fundamental task of the curriculum study: namely, the task of sorting out principles and concepts of individual and social behavior and the application of these basic concepts to the administration component. Surely this accomplishment will cover much that is involved in the administrative process and will then allow the sorting of that which remains for some special consideration. This charting in the publication will require considerable refinement and development, yet its fundamental value lies in its suggestion of goal and method. The brevity of the tabular system, as with the study as a whole, leaves one wondering what the content would have been if fully developed.

Traditional and New Views in Conflict

The abstractions of the study on the "Nature of Administration as Currently Practiced in Business, Government, and Professions, with Special Relevance to Social Work Education" on pages 21 and 22 would have been clearer if tied in one by one with concepts encompassed by the described principle and in traditional language. The connecting paragraph between this brief statement and the statements on administration in social work indicated that the literature reveals little or no antagonism between standards of administration in business and industry and social work and that social work can make use of business research in this regard. In the most enlightened new developments in other fields, this observation might with some exceptions be valid. It does not take into account, however, the tremendous struggle going on between the traditional and new views. It doesn't distinguish possible differences between social work and business views. For example, the social work view of the principle of participation in policy formation may carry a more fundamental feeling for implementa-

tion by the social worker because of his background of training in the behavioral and social sciences and in the casework, group work disciplines. Similarly, the business struggle in integrating new knowledge regarding motivation of people should be noted. The last thing which the connecting paragraph in the study does not do is to acknowledge the extensive knowledge and theory which social work can contribute to the field of administration as we study and refine the connections between case and group work skills and administrative practice.

In summary this study presents as its major findings: (1) that the current masters curriculum and the social work schools provide 'a basic introduction to administrative theory and practice; (2) that the emphasis on training in administration should be on the preparation of social workers in administrative skills rather than the preparation of adminis-

trators who have social work skills; and (3) that a generic approach be taken in the curriculum development of offerings in administration, community organization, and social policy.

The questions raised in this review are overshadowed by the positive values of this study. Some will find fault with the limited scope of the study method, but too often we do nothing rather than seek limited study objectives that are a foundation on which the later advances toward fuller knowledge can be based. Certainly, nothing in the curriculum study suggests finality in its conclusions. Dr. Boehm indicated in his foreword in the first volume that the study reports were an attempt to establish a design for an effectively balanced social work curriculum. He acknowledged that where the study raises questions, then educational experiments of various kinds should be designed to study these questions.

Decision-Making and Institutions

The direction taken by political scientists since World War II represents a reaction to the overemphasis put by their teachers on the study of organizational forms. The reaction has been a healthy one. Today the political scientist is interested in the "decision-maker," the forces which influence him, his relations with other decision-makers—in the politics of the decision-making process, not its mechanics. The risk in this approach is clear: it is sometimes forgotten that institutions influence men as well as the other way around. It may be that the most important thing to know about Mr. Stans is that he is the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.

—HENRY M. JACKSON, "Organizing for Survival," *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1960.

Developments in Public Administration

Compiled by WILLIAM B. SHORE

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New Ripples in Federalism's Marble Cake: States, U. S. Eye Metropolitan Problems

"There is no reason to be discouraged by the slowness with which the people of America are fashioning governments for their metropolises. Satisfactory local government for such complicated and dynamic communities will not be developed by professors or professional researchers. It will come from the efforts, often contrary in their intent and effect, of thousands of individuals and organized groups, repeated and modified over long periods of time," according to Professor Victor Jones. ("Governing the Metropolis: The Post-war Experience," in Stanley Scott, ed., *Metropolitan Area Problems* (Bureau of Public Administration, University of California, Berkeley, 1960).)

Unsoothed, some professors and professional researchers continue to preach metropolitan-wide government. Some recent examples:

Paul Studenski, professor of economics and of public administration: "There is much talk today about the supposed potency of voluntary inter-municipal cooperation on the common needs of urban and suburban populations. It is contended that the self-interest of local governments will produce agreement among them on a common line of action. Actually, there is no support for this contention." It has never worked and nothing indicates it will, though it might be a stepping stone toward an arrangement with power, eventually a superstructure of metropolitan government, Studenski writes. He is optimistic that metropolitan government is possible even in the New York area. ("Metropolitan Areas 1960," 49 *National Civic Review* 537-542, 548 (November, 1960).)

Luther Gulick, President of the Institute of Public Administration: The important metropolitan problems are political not technical nor even financial. "We know that such po-

litical decisions can be made only by representative institutions based on a political constituency which is as broad as the problem to be dealt with. Most local governments are too narrow to act on these matters." ("Intergovernmental Organization," *Proceedings of the Local Government Workshop*, June 5-8, 1960 (Office for Local Government, New York State, 1961).)

Paul Ylvisaker, Ford Foundation: "We are moving—I think wisely—toward some form of metropolitan government, not because we know what we should do about the many problems of urban life and the city, but precisely because we do not know. To resolve our many differences and uncertainties as to how we ought to live in an urban environment . . . —this is what metropolitan government is all about." ("Metropolitan Government—For What?" in Scott, op. cit.)

A business group, the Committee for Economic Development, has joined the professional researchers: "Governments with metropolitan-wide powers are needed to make effective decisions about the region's transportation network, its broad pattern of land use, the contamination of its air and streams, and its common recreational and open-space needs." ("Guiding Metropolitan Growth," August, 1960.)

The Record of Metropolitan Government

Furthermore, the record of federated metropolitan government in Toronto since it began operating January 1, 1954 is reported to be excellent.

The thirteen-city federation encompassing more than a million residents of the Toronto area has undoubtedly won "rather widespread acceptance." The metropolitan government has moved cautiously on some important matters—for example, "a wholesale rezoning of the area is probably needed, but nothing could create more enemies for Metro than for

the planning board to instigate such a rezoning." On the other hand, mass transportation and highways have been planned to fit together, and both are good compared to other cities.

Metro has "provided coordinated and cheaper financing for the whole area; has virtually solved the water and sewage disposal problems; is finally beginning to make some headway in regard to spreading the financial burden of education; has established an efficient, centralized police force; . . . is making progress in removing the area's deficiencies in parks and recreational centers; is spreading a modern freeway system throughout the area; and is providing better welfare service, particularly for the aged, without causing undue stress upon the finances of any one sector in the metropolitan region."

There seems little sentiment for eliminating the metropolitan level of government and only a little for eliminating the local constituent bodies. The local units have few important functions, but since they "are represented on the Metropolitan Council by their governmental heads, there can be the feeling that the local units still have a purpose. . . ." (John G. Grumm, *Metropolitan Area Government: The Toronto Experience* (University of Kansas Governmental Research Center, 1959).)

A similar arrangement in Dade County, Florida has weathered severe political storms since the new charter went into effect in July, 1957, but the first county manager, O. W. Campbell, did not weather the most recent storm.

The local Chamber of Commerce government research council reported glowingly, however, on the first three years, citing as progress the administrative reorganizations from "horse and buggy county government," countywide reassessment, initiation of a master plan, steps toward a unified transit system, beginning of reconstruction of the port, plans for consolidating more than fifty water and sewer systems, plans and construction begun on a countywide highway system, establishment of a metropolitan court, uniform traffic, building and subdivision controls, and a central police radio and accident record system. (Note that Dade County has tackled some touchy political problems.) The Chamber's over-all assessment: all ills have not been

cured, but growing efficiency means that "Dade taxpayers should be getting more for their money from now on" despite tax rises. ("Metropolitan Dade County—Its First Three Years," mimeographed.)

Elsewhere—Rejection

Nevertheless, metropolitan government proposals in St. Louis, Cleveland, Nashville, Knoxville, and Seattle have been defeated by voters. Although the American Municipal Association 1960 policy statement called for easier annexation and consolidation rules, and the National Association of County Officials has suggested increasing county functions as a metropolitan government solution, local government spokesmen generally speak against change in local government structure at the metropolitan level.

For example, at a Pacific Coast seminar on metropolitan problems in 1958, local officials remained adamant against "a super level of metropolitan government and the special-purpose district," feeling that "existing governments can solve many of the present problems by use of greater imagination"—as a workshop chairman reported his session's consensus. These officials apparently were unconvinced by speeches of leading students of metropolitan problems urging, in one way or another, a unit of general metropolitan government. (Scott, op. cit.)

Another example: the Northeastern Illinois Metropolitan Area Local Government Services Commission did not recommend metropolitan government for the Chicago area partly because "virtually every local official testifying before the Commission" was reluctant "to relinquish local control of any governmental function." (*Second Report* (Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois, 1959).)

Furthermore, some observers predict growing difficulty in winning agreement of suburban dwellers to join in a governmental unit with the older cities as the social, economic, and racial mixture of the populations continue to diverge.

The one recent legislative movement toward metropolitan-wide government was the passage by four state governments in 1959 of laws giving the state a voice in determining whether new municipalities could incorporate or annex old municipalities or consolidate.

**In Lieu of Metropolitan Government:
Functional Integration**

"In Cleveland, . . . proponents of the defeated charter are now talking about a piecemeal attack, function by function, on urban difficulties." (Henry J. Schmandt, "The Area Council—Approach to Metropolitan Government," 42 *Public Management* 30-32 (February, 1960).) Many metropolitan areas have chosen this course, establishing special districts to control air pollution, devise a transportation system, develop a port, operate an airport, provide water or drain off sewage. Between 1952 and 1957, 519 new special districts were created in metropolitan areas.

Because these special district governments seldom are representative of the population or closely related to general governmental units, they cannot provide an adequate decision-making process, most observers say. They can get a job done, probably more economically than it could have been done by piecemeal governments, but they seldom coordinate their program with related programs in the area or contribute to a rational choice among activities that might be undertaken for the tax dollar of the metropolitan resident. "When you set up a function in a single authority, that single authority knows it was designated by God to do a certain job—and its work is the most important task in the world. Nothing can stand in the way of what the authority is planning to accomplish. They don't care if they bankrupt the town—they're going to get their job done because that's the only job they have to do." (Luther Gulick, "How Do We Get Off Dead Center?" Scott, op. cit.)

Making Special Districts General

But these weaknesses may not be inherent in the functional approach to metropolitan solutions, although the tendencies are strong. When, Gulick asks, does a government become "general"? When it provides three services, four? Perhaps, some suggest, we can approach metropolitan government through consolidation of special-purpose governments. Victor Jones observed that the "architects" of the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit and Air Pollution Control Districts have recognized the danger of superimposing on the municipal and county governments an array of disjointed special governments. They "hope to meet it by tying the cities and counties to the govern-

ing boards of the districts in order to facilitate consolidation of the districts into a general but limited government for the San Francisco Bay area." The California legislature is considering a bill allowing multi-purpose special districts. (Scott, op. cit.)

Similarly, a sewage disposal special district, devised to handle an emergency water contamination problem in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area, may have power to perform other services when the constituent local governments agree that a service can be better performed by the special district. To achieve local responsibility, the governing council would be selected by and from local elected officials. Washington state also passed a law allowing multiple-purpose as well as single-purpose special districts, but Seattle voters' first reaction was to start with a single problem.

Contracting for Services

A variation of the special district is the contract system. California municipalities have signed some 3,000 contracts with counties for municipal-type services. The "Lakewood plan" carries contracting to the extreme—all services are provided by the county, but the city council and city administrator make policies, set standards for contracted services, and take responsibility for the provision of adequate service. California cities that depend heavily on contracted services held a first annual conference last spring and heard predictions that such contracting would spread.

In St. Louis County (Missouri), the practice also has been adopted. As of December, 1959, the county supplied municipal services to 81 of its 98 municipalities under 241 contracts.

Contracting differs from special district handling of a functional need in that the local government can balance one spending item against another and policy remains in a direct line to constituencies while economies of size and experience are garnered. On the other hand, some diseconomies probably occur by comparison to special districts because contracting is optional and the service area may not end up in a compact shape for many programs. In any case, contracting does not contribute to setting regional goals or guiding regional development or giving control of decisions affecting the whole region to residents of the whole region.

Why Special Districts?

Edward C. Banfield explains the voters' acceptance of special districts in social psychology terms: "The lower-class ideal of government, which recognized no community larger than the ward and measured advantages only in favors, 'gravy,' and nationality 'recognition,' has almost everywhere gone out of fashion. . . . The ascendant middle-class ideal of government emphasizes 'public values,' especially impartiality, consistency, and efficiency. . . . The impartial expert who 'gets things done' in spite of 'politicians' and 'pressure groups' has become a familiar figure on the urban scene and even something of a folk hero. . . . The special function district or authority is, of course, [his] natural habitat; without the protection it affords from the electorate [he] could not survive."

In any case, his argument implies, unified government would not produce a unified metropolitan plan. "Plan making is with us an idle exercise, for we neither agree upon the content of a 'public interest' that ought to override private ones nor permit the centralization of authority needed to carry a plan into effect. . . ." ("The Political Implications of Metropolitan Growth," 90 *Daedalus* 61-78 (Winter, 1961).)

In Lieu of Metropolitan Government: Cooperation, Confederation

"What seems to be shaping up in many places is a loose but formal federation of local governments which will have a limited tax base sooner or later, engage in regional planning, wield considerable influence, and ultimately exercise some qualified authority over land-use," in the view of planning lecturer Catherine Bauer Wurster. ("Framework for an Urban Society," *Goals for Americans*, The Report of the President's Commission on National Goals (Prentice-Hall, 1960).)

Regional councils of local officials without powers except to seek cooperative action have developed in at least six metropolitan areas in recent months.

Two counties, a state, a school district and a city signed a Compact of Intergovernmental Cooperation in Salem, Oregon late in 1959 after an eighteen-month study of ways in which cooperation could improve the government of the region. Since the study began, these five units of government have started

regional programs for parks, sewage disposal, airport and river port, and a transportation study and have extended joint purchasing which already had been begun. A council meets regularly but has no formal powers.

New York's Metropolitan Regional Council has not won official status but continues as a forum for elected executives of twenty-one counties and their larger cities in the three-state area. It has worked on traffic communication and uniform laws, minimum requirements for drinking, driving and marriage, transportation, air and water pollution, parks, recreation and open space and water supply.

The Association of (San Francisco) Bay Area Governments has been joined by most of the eligible local units and has begun to operate, as has the Washington, D. C. Metropolitan Regional Conference, which includes on its governing board members of the Virginia and Maryland legislatures and of Congress as well as county and city elected officials and the District commissioners. County officials in the Detroit area have been meeting since 1957 and officials in the Omaha area recently formed an association.

The activities of one or more of these groups include: sponsoring research, collecting data, seeking consensus on approaches to mutual problems, arranging for and guiding special districts, and lobbying state and federal governments. Elected officials generally make up the executive groups of the associations.

Regional planning agencies are similar to these councils since their single program is broadly related to metropolitan development as a whole. A planner reports increasing numbers of regional planning agencies and no abandonments. Like the general metropolitan regional council, the planning agencies must get results through action agencies of government, becoming, in effect, a lobby for a metropolitan point of view. (David A. Grossman, "Regional Planning," *Proceedings of the Eleventh Governor's Conference*, August 20-21, 1959 (Bureau of Government Research, University of Massachusetts).)

Mrs. Wurster points out that the effectiveness of a metropolitan group of local governments depends in part on the effectiveness of its members' governments. "If suburban governments continue to become better organized through large incorporations, city-counties or

other means, the federation will thereby be greatly strengthened. A few relatively strong agencies can cooperate far more effectively than an elderly giant and a hundred wayward infants. Our basic goal, a multi-centered region with a network of strong balanced cities, would help to solve the perennial issue of metropolitan unification."

Enthusiasm for cooperation as a solution to many urban problems is matched by skepticism.

On the one hand, Robert P. Aex, first Director of the New York State Office for Local Government: "The great opportunity for local government to service adequately the booming population in metropolitan areas lies in governmental cooperation." ("State-Local Relations in New York State," *Eleventh [Massachusetts] Governor's Conference*, op. cit.)

On the other hand, the Metropolitan Community Studies of Dayton, commenting on extensive efforts of local governments in that area to cooperate both informally and by contract: "Disagreement has been common. . . . Resolving such difficulties consumes considerable time and causes undue delays in sorely needed [facilities]. . . . Progress in solving metropolitan problems will remain slow, costly, and frustrating as long as the task depends upon the voluntary cooperation of numerous local governments." Furthermore, most cooperative efforts "will end in failure and frustration simply because they seek to cope with highly interrelated matters on an unrelated basis." (*Metropolitan Challenge* (November, 1959).)

The Resulting Trend

In sum, observers continue to favor some kind of metropolitanwide general government, though most prefer a federal type in which communities as well as individuals are represented and some activities remain "close to the people." The public and public officials, however, have rejected most recent efforts to achieve metropolitan government directly. (The Dayton study suggests a general political obstacle: the casual voter tends to oppose change, and he is precisely the man most difficult to reach—a nonjoiner.)

Yet, we are moving closer to solutions to metropolitan problems from two sides: (1) increasing the number of special districts, with some planning to broaden these to multi-

purpose governments representative of the smaller governments within the area, and a variant—contracting by municipalities for government services provided by larger government units; and (2) informal associations of governments in a metropolitan area to work voluntarily toward mutual goals.

"Another development is increasing reliance on a higher level of government to meet area-wide needs. State highway departments and state park commissions have . . . provided for local and metropolitan needs in the absence of a metropolitan agency. In recent years the difficulty of meeting area needs from local resources has pushed the call for assistance to the Federal level. . . . The rise in Federal and state contributions to municipal revenue, noted earlier, is a result of the need to carry problems to a higher level. . . . At present only the state and Federal governments can tap the economic resources of the area as a whole for necessary public purposes. Thus there is increasing pressure by localities for state and Federal assistance to deal with problems which the individual municipal government is incapable of managing or financing." (Committee For Economic Development, op. cit.)

Progress has been made in winning state and federal interest and action in the metropolitan area. Most recently, New York and New Jersey have acted to save commuter rail transportation—a peculiarly metropolitan need—and two U. S. Senate committees are considering federal action on it. About half of the expenditures under the interstate highway program are within metropolitan areas.

A highway program originally dedicated to getting the farmers out of the mud has been slowly turned to building urban highways and now stands on the verge of incorporating mass transit facilities. A housing program conceived in the interest of homeowners, the construction industry and financial institutions adds first a community renewal, then a rehabilitation, then a conservation, and finally a planning section. A Park Service conceived in anger toward and fear of private interests has gradually reoriented itself toward the job of providing recreational facilities and preserving open spaces for metropolitan populations." (Robert C. Wood, "The Case for a Department of Urban Affairs," paper to the American Political Science Association, September, 1960.)

Furthermore, a wide variety of persons seem to accept this movement of responsibility up-

ward as necessary and/or proper. A report signed by more than 300 New York state and local officials, civic leaders, businessmen and scholars made these points:

... The traditional home rule of the 19th century can no longer obtain and ... effective home rule must be a doctrine which recognizes the prerogatives of the State, as well as the interests of municipalities. ...

It is suggested also that there is real need for a state master plan for the economic growth and development of the entire state.

Under a system of cooperative federalism the Federal government, too, has responsibilities in state and local governmental affairs. The members of the Conference express particularly their concern that the metropolitan problem receive adequate attention by Federal agencies working cooperatively with the State and with our local units. (*Local Government Workshop*, op. cit.)

New York State's Joint Legislative Committee on Metropolitan Areas Study reported in 1959 that the state executive branch should give "increased attention to local problems ... to offset the march of municipal officials to Washington. ..." (Legislative Document No. 19.)

The workshop chairman on "The States Look at the Metropolitan Problem" at the Pacific Coast seminar reported: "The state has the role of looking ahead, as well as a regional planning role, and should not permit the unguided development of a series of individual metropolitan areas."

And the President has proposed a cabinet-level agency on urban affairs: "We must begin now to lay the foundations for livable, efficient and attractive communities of the future. ... Urban renewal programs to date have been too narrow to cope effectively with the basic problems facing older cities. We must do more than concern ourselves with bad housing—we must reshape our cities into effective nerve centers for expanding metropolitan areas. Our urban renewal efforts must be substantially reoriented from slum clearance and slum prevention into positive programs for economic and social regeneration." The President also announced (1) "an immediate and extensive study of urban transportation problems and the proper role of the Federal government in their solution" and (2) a study to work out long-range policy on "open space and orderly development of urban land." (*New York Times*, March 10, 1961, p. 14.)

Why the Campaign Moved to Washington

Wood explains the "urbanists'" abandonment of the local front for a major campaign in Washington in his paper setting out the value of a federal Department of Urban Affairs:

... They have been committed by the nature of their major objectives to the most difficult job of politics—constitution-making. They have faced local and state political institutions which were at the start inefficient, unrepresentative, and often corrupt. Moreover, they have undertaken reform under circumstances in which no Act of God, no breakdown in the provision of the essentials of community life, no crises in maintenance of law and order, erupted to bring the public in indignation and alarm to their cause. To make matters worse, they have embarked on a program to strengthen and improve the urban pattern of living in a country where the prevailing political ideology was profoundly anti-urban. They have discovered judicial interpretations which typically regarded big city governments as incapable of exercising the most minimal public powers. They have found legislatures at the state and national levels which were rigged to favor rural sentiments.

Wood adds that in Washington urbanists need to lobby in "that place where reason, planning, conceptualizing, and realism have some political currency—in the bureaucracy."

By and large, he finds, the federal executive has accepted the urbanists' ideas more than the people living in the urban regions themselves. To do the job well, however, urbanists need a cabinet voice, Wood contends: "'representativeness' in the sense of being able to disagree with the Chief Executive or to influence him in terms other than logical argument. ..." The urbanist argues for this in the name of "fashioning more viable local structures of government on more rational bases, ... building better communities and ... hence strengthening the main timbers of the Federal structure"—"without a real rather than an apparent drift toward centralization." And in the name of speed, for relatively permanent patterns of development are hastily forming as we rapidly urbanize.

Molding the Program Locally

Though metropolitan areas apparently must look to special districts, to states and to the federal government for action, often they can mold the program to fit their own plans—if there are—or can be—metropolitan plans. Furthermore, it is at the metropolitan level that

the specialized programs—housing, highways, urban renewal, etc.—can best be put together into a comprehensive plan. (The sharpest critics of the use of special districts because they result in uncoordinated development also criticize the federal government for failure to coordinate its programs, though its programs emanate from a single governmental unit.) To influence state, federal or even special district programs, councils of local governments often need only agree on a general formula, getting along without governmental powers because they operate as a lobby at the state and federal levels to initiate programs and as a strong citizen group to guide programs as they are applied to their metropolis.

A recent study of highway decisions in Pennsylvania suggests exactly this role for local governments: as bridge between the public and the higher levels of government and as the only level of government which considers nonhighway as well as highway aspects. The writers note that when local units have had their plans in hand, they were able to influence a highway's location without any legal power to do so. (Davis, Lewis, and Vodnoy, "Pressures in the Process of Administrative Decision: A Study of Highway Location," 108 *University of Pennsylvania Law Review* 534-586 (February, 1960).)

The Kennedy urban program fits this conception. Amid proposals for new federal action, the President called for "an effective and comprehensive planning process in each metropolitan area embracing all major activities, both public and private, which shape the community," and he recommended a five-fold increase in the authorization of urban and metropolitan planning grants and a rise in the federal share.

However, a careful survey of federal-local relations has found that today, despite a great deal of municipal lobbying in Washington, "no one represents the metropolitan areas. . . . It may well be that the same congressional committee or executive official will hear directly conflicting testimony from representatives of adjoining municipalities, and no testimony at all for other municipalities in the same metropolitan area. . . . Until the piecemeal approach is replaced by a strong and unified voice, an orderly and coherent federal program for metropolitan growth and evolution will not be developed. . . ." (Robert H.

Connery and Richard H. Leach, *The Federal Government and Metropolitan Areas* (Harvard University Press, 1960).)

Marble Cake Federalism

All of this fits our new conception of federalism—as marble cake rather than layer cake, in Morton Grodzins' words. Though the conception may be new, Grodzins points out that the fact is not. ". . . Relative to what governments did, intergovernmental cooperation during the last century was comparable with that existing today."

Grodzins finds it difficult to locate any governmental activity that does not involve all three levels of government—even foreign affairs. "The national supervision of such programs is largely a process of mutual accommodation. Leading state and local officials, acting through their professional organizations, are in considerable part responsible for the very standards that national officers try to persuade all state and local officers to accept." A recent example of a similar phenomenon: federal legislation on open space is being developed in part on the basis of a study co-sponsored by the New York Metropolitan Regional Council, an association of local government officials.

In addition to positive efforts toward cooperative federalism, Grodzins notes an obstacle that should be eliminated—competition for industry by tax cutting. He suggests that federal taxes be offset up to a stated amount for income taxes levied by the states—providing states with sufficient revenue without competitive loss due to using the income tax. ("The Federal System," *Goals for Americans*, op. cit.) Similarly, a group of New York region business executives, discussing problems of planning for a vastly increased population in 1985, commented: "As long as they are heavily dependent on property taxes within their own boundaries, local units cannot afford to support a plan that is in the best interest of the Region if the net result does not happen to produce sufficient property tax revenue for themselves." (*A Report of 40 Business Executives: Planning for the New York Metropolitan Region* (Regional Plan Association, 1961).)

Despite wide acceptance of the mild chaos of marble cake federalism, many feel it essential to work for clearer lines of responsi-

bility. Emmette S. Redford and John A. Perkins added to Grodzins' statement: "Ascertainable responsibility for policy, administrative performance, and financing is an essential feature of effective self-government. The possibility of achieving it needs to be explored." They acknowledge that "a reduction of the sharing of power would to some degree cause greater centralization of responsibility in the federal government," but neither "appropriate administrative decentralization" nor "influence by the ordinary citizen over the activities of government" need be lost.

Similarly, amid many voices of concern for loss of "close-to-the-people" governments in metropolitan areas, Government Affairs Foundation commented: "The tangle of governments found in most metropolitan areas has been a real barrier to the public understanding and participation which insures effective democratic control." (*Metropolitan Surveys: A Digest* (Public Administration Service, 1959).)

The Joint Federal-State Action Committee tried to shape the ripples of marble cake federalism back into layers and failed. The new Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations starts with a different view of reality, expressed by its vice chairman, James K. Pollock:

"Finally, it should be clear to everyone that our problems are not merely federal-state problems but they are also state-local problems and federal-local problems. The relatively simple pattern of relationships of past decades has been superseded by a labyrinth of interrelationships quite bewildering in nature, to say the least. The result is that we must all give more time to our relationships with neighboring and overlapping jurisdictions whatever they may be." ("Chronic Overlapping," 49 *National Civic Review* 602-609 (December, 1960).)

And we have only begun to recognize the next urban problem: governing megalopolis (the almost-unbroken urban strips from Boston to Washington, from Los Angeles to Mexico, etc.)

Psychologists View Administration

Psychologists working on management problems presented a summary of recent organizational research at the American Psychological Association 1959 convention. ("Psy-

chologists in Administration (A Symposium)" 13 *Personnel Psychology* 261-300 (Autumn, 1960).)

Styles of Leadership

Styles of organization leadership are most clearly distinguished, Ohio State researchers have found, by (1) whether or not the leaders tend to initiate action (e.g., trying out new ideas on the staff, criticizing poor work, assigning tasks, emphasizing deadlines, encouraging uniform procedures, letting staff members know where they stand, and coordinating) and (2) whether or not they are considerate of others (e.g., doing personal favors, listening to subordinates, being willing to make changes, and getting subordinates' approval on important things before going ahead).

"When persons in an organization are requested to describe the ideal behavior of a person in an administrative or supervisory role, it is apparent that they want both [initiation and consideration]. . .," Carroll L. Shartle reported. In different organizations, however, personnel seemed to want different proportions of initiating activity and of consideration—in the military more initiating, in a university more consideration. These two characteristics may be combined in a team rather than in an individual, the head of an organization being high in initiating, the deputy high in consideration, or vice versa.

Objective measures so far have failed to relate particular leadership styles to productivity, partly because objective criteria are difficult to develop for a large enough sample of units. But researchers have found that flexibility "seems to be an important aspect" of successful leadership and that subordinates weigh consideration more heavily in rating leadership than do top administrators.

There are a few measures which partially identify some elements of initiating and consideration behavior, but adding these elements to an executive's style "through training or therapy would appear to be a difficult task and one requiring a long period of time." Even then the atmosphere of the organization must reinforce the behavioral change.

Achieving High Productivity

Worker satisfaction and productivity are not necessarily related, Robert L. Kahn of the

University of Michigan's Survey Research Center emphasized—"despite the persistence with which managers and managerial consultants place them in juxtaposition. . . ." Even more complex, four different kinds of work satisfaction have been identified by the Center: satisfaction with (1) the job, (2) the organization, (3) the supervision, and (4) the rewards and opportunities. None were related significantly to productivity in the last major study in which the relationship was tested.

Patterns of supervision were related to productivity, however. The supervisor of high productivity work groups spent less time doing the kinds of things his subordinates do, more time planning and supervising. He showed more sensitivity to the needs of subordinates, more concern with them as persons—for example, training them for better jobs, talking with them about off-job problems, and speaking for his men within the organization. (In low productivity units, one study showed, an informal leader often spoke for the group.) High-production supervisors did not punish as readily as others; they sought remedies, not penalties.

But high-productivity supervisors were not entirely employee-centered. They also were production-oriented. Supervisors who are only employee-oriented sometimes achieve "a superficial popularity," the researchers feel, and "in time this would be replaced by feelings of aimlessness and lack of accomplishment." But "the supervisor who emphasizes production to the detriment of employee requirements is . . . less successful both with respect to productivity . . . and the attitudes of his men," according to results of the last of the Center's three major studies.

The supervisor's supervisor also may be a factor in productivity. High achievement supervisors generally felt under less pressure from their supervisors than low-productivity supervisors and felt that production was only "one of the most important things on the job, but not the most important. . . ." Lower production foremen "were more likely to report that their own supervisors either overemphasized the achievement of high production . . . or underemphasized it.

Relations of workers in a work group also were related to productivity, the high producer being more likely to want to stay with

his present work group than the low producer. Cohesiveness of groups, however, sometimes is linked to low productivity—apparently depending upon whether the work group feels close to management or to the union.

To Mate or Balance Productivity and Satisfaction

Though productivity and worker-satisfaction are not necessarily related now, can we organize work so they become related? If not, which shall we prefer—worker satisfaction or productivity—and in which measure? Our wealth and the fact that our culture is oriented around our work organizations—in contrast to cultures which center life around the church, the state or the family—are relevant to the question, W. J. Humber observed in another APA paper.

Humber reports the warnings of Chris Argyris and Douglas McGregor that work must better satisfy man's noneconomic needs now that human physiological and safety needs are satisfied. Workers are not mature, whole people, Argyris says; they "react with indolence, passivity, resistance to change, lack of responsibility, willingness to follow demagogues, and unreasonable economic demands," McGregor adds. "Direction and control" are useless for motivating modern man, according to McGregor—"whether implemented with the hard, the soft, or the firm but fair approach. . . ."

To adapt organizations to these new conditions of motivation, Humber observes, business has tried to decentralize, to increase delegation, encourage participation in decisions, enlarge jobs so that each worker has more control over how his work is done, to adapt leadership style to the group to be led, and to find supervisors who are concerned for "the employee's needs, creative capacities, and perceptions."

All of this, Humber warns, does not mean that organizations—even strongly led organizations—are bad. "People need organizations. . . . They are seldom found separated from one another, although some of the research seems to make that assumption." Organizations need to define leadership roles and status clearly. They need decisive leaders. ("The role of the captain of a ship is to be captain. . . .") And clear objectives. ("When . . . goals are vague or obscure or when there is lack of vigor and confidence in the pursuit of

these objectives, an atmosphere of purposelessness and listlessness pervades the organization.")

Humber advocates "a reasonable amount of group-centered behavior," arranging, "insofar as possible, [that] the leaders of the formal organization will be the natural leaders who already have status with the informal organization," and encouraging "well-knit informal groups."

Adaptability is the final ingredient in a healthy organization, Humber indicates. "The best security an organization has is in its own capacity for anticipating its future growth and in working desperately for its early realization."

"The effective administrator is one who is able to create a situation in which each individual is free enough and challenged enough constantly to precipitate himself into just manageable difficulty. He would then be leader of a group which is constantly out of balance, that is constantly working to establish order while investing an appropriate amount of effort at creating intelligent confusion, at establishing disorder—a group that constantly engages in reconstructing itself," Humber quoted from a paper at a previous APA meeting by Nicholas Hobbs.

Researchers also have shown that organizational leadership is not simply related to the particular job. New executives often differ markedly from their predecessors in what they do and how.

The Organization's Behavior

In addition to these efforts to identify successful organizational leadership, researchers have been looking at organizations as systems, trying to describe them in such a way that their behavior can be predicted, Harold J. Leavitt notes. In doing this, some observers (e.g., Simon and March) are watching for variations in such factors as intergroup conflict, innovation, and compensation and are searching for ways to account for the differences that exist among organizations.

Behavior and attitudes of individuals within the organization—levels of satisfaction and aspiration and expected value of reward—are dissected in somewhat new ways, also. And researchers are looking at decision-making, observing how data are sought. Most decisions, they have found, satisfy the immediate needs

but are not the best possible answers because optimum solutions require too costly or time-consuming research and generally are not compatible with human personality.

Some of the descriptions of organizations use biological organisms as models. One analogy, expressed by Mason Haire, is that organisms must change shape and add internal organs as they change size. Empirically, Haire has shown that as small companies grew large, all of their organizations were modified in similar ways—for example in the ratio of the number of persons dealing with clientele to the total personnel.

Marschak constructs organizational models of somewhat different parts than the Simon-March school. An organization is "several persons' who 'agree to follow a certain set of rules that are supposed to further certain goals.' This set of rules is the organizational form." All the rules concern communication—among organizational members, to the outside, and even between the individual and his memory. Patterns of communication can be compared according to probable costs and payoffs (e.g., centralization vs. decentralization, which is simply a change in communication flow).

Applying the Research

What of these academic analyses has been put to use?

Leavitt has observed that "there is abundant evidence" that human relations and information technology ideas are changing industrial organizations, "especially at the middle levels," for example, human relations training and "business school-taught, business journal-promulgated, and consulting firm-carried-out techniques which include the use of committees, the encouragement of easy expression of feelings across status levels, etc."

Information technology, primarily mathematical, seems, at least in the short run, to demand action counter to what human relations research requires. And, in the short run, "information technology is, by far, the greater of the two powers. . . ." But "the two are inseparably intertwined," and human relations research already is following the lead of information technology in exploring the conscious thought processes of human beings. Leavitt is confident that practical results will accrue from the marriage.

Comment and Critique

Brief letters on *Review* articles and other public administration matters, selected for general interest, stimulating ideas, and thoughtful content. Letters are welcomed by the Editors.

Pay for Position or Pay for Person?

It is perhaps worth consideration that the federal civil service loses more than it gains by the dominance it places upon positions, and position classification, in its system of personnel administration. Incipient if not actual confusion and potential if not actual heart-break for individuals result.

Schedule C jobs are good examples of the effect of this confusion. Schedule C appointees and the manner of protection afforded Civil Service "career" employees in Schedule C jobs occur in a system which places its dominant emphasis upon position classification.

Suppose, rather than Schedule C *jobs*, the system spoke of Schedule C *people*? What would these Schedule C people be, in *people* classification? They would be of many sorts, certainly. Occupationally, they might range from chauffeur to secretary to national policy executive. Yet they would all have one value in common; these people would normally be "non-career" people, so far as the word "career" is in this context applied to Federal Civil Service.

Consequently, if a federal "career" civil servant assumed such duties, it should be with the clear understanding that he was, by that move, abandoning his "career" in the "career" civil service, thereby removing himself from whatever values it formerly had held for him. It should be a judgment for him to make, with full understanding of this fact.

The notion of Schedule C *positions* simply confuses the basic fact that the individual is accepting an appointment with a non-Civil Service career status. He forgets that career status, and its opposite, non-career status, are pertinent to individuals.

So when such pertinency is assigned to positions we reap trouble. It is people who are "career" or "non-career" and not positions.

Harold Leigh¹ has posed an issue of whether personnel systems can accommodate "rank-in-the-position" and "rank-in-the-person" in the same system. It appears beyond question that they can. People work in jobs, and jobs require people. People can be "ranked" in specialties, and positions can be "ranked" in specialties, in ways useful to good personnel administration; ways which are complementary, rather than contradictory.

However, excessive emphasis upon one or the other kind of classification, if they are significantly different in emphasis in a single personnel system, may complicate this issue. One system may emphasize the assignment of pay-grade level to a *position*, while another may assign greater emphasis to the assignment of pay-grade level to the *person*. The processes for accomplishing each purpose are uniquely different in each system.

So while "rank-in-the-person" and "rank-in-the-position" may be an issue, it is not the basic one. The true basic issue becomes discernible when the staffing of an entity—an organization, an agency, a service, a branch of government, an enterprise—is thought of as the end purpose of its career and personnel system. The role of "classification" then becomes significant to that end. But "classification," in this sense, is nothing more than the "pigeonholing" of *something*.

The product of the classification process in personnel administration does usually involve "grades." Grades are no more than "rank" levels, usually associated in some fashion with ascending and descending levels of responsibilities. Most personnel and career systems also classify by "specialties," called "series" in the federal civil service system. This classification process can be applied to *positions* and to *people*, or to both. In federal civil serv-

¹ Harold L. Leigh, "Rank in Man or Job? Both!" 20 PAR 92-99 (Spring, 1960).

ice classification emphasis is, as we have said, upon positions; why? One reason is the Classification Act itself. Look at the language of that Act: "AN ACT to establish a standard schedule of rates of basic compensation for certain *employees* of the Federal Government; to provide for an equitable *system* for fixing and adjusting rates of basic compensation of *individual employees*; to repeal the Classification Act of 1923; and for other purposes."² Note that the emphasis here is entirely upon employees—individual employees.

Now proceed to "Title I—Declaration of Policy. Sec. 101—It is the purpose of the Act to provide a plan for the *classification of positions* and for rates of basic compensation. . . ."³

In one breath, this influential act shifts from a declaration regarding a system for people to a declaration regarding a plan for classification of positions. However inadvertently this might have been done, its ambiguity is a symptom of the lack of clear distinction between the system's emphasis on *positions* and *people* in its methodology.

What is really controlling in this matter is *dominance*. Which shall dominate in a particular personnel and career system—relative evaluation of individual positions, or relative evaluation of individual people?

In the academic world, a structured hierarchy of ranks (grades) obtains which is almost universal. These ranks pertain to individuals and are a mark of the individual's relative achievement among his peers. In this particular career and personnel system, comparative "grading" of individuals dominates. Formal schemes for emphasis upon relative evaluation of positions, e.g., job descriptions, job evaluations, are almost non-existent.

In the federal civil service the opposite is clearly apparent. Some thousands of specialists in federal personnel offices classify positions. They do it because of the Classification Act, of course. But, in addition, there is another fundamental reason which escapes many persons. In the academic world, if we continue our example, the professor's pay is relevant to his attained "rank" or grade. A full professor normally is paid more than an instructor. (This is not necessarily relevant to his subject-

matter field at all.) In federal civil service, *pay* attaches to grade achieved by *position* classification and attainment of pay-grade is contingent upon attainment of *position*. The classification of the position then determines the person's pay. Even the specialty, as symbolized by the series, sometimes has a bearing upon the pay resulting from the position classification process.

It is the thesis here that the *pay* determination process determines which *kind* of classification—classification of *positions* or classification of *people*—will dominate a given personnel system. In the federal civil service this means that classification of positions is dominant because the pay of the individual is determined primarily by position classification. In other systems, pay is for personal rank achieved, and the personal rank emphasis dominates, with current position assignments of no consequence.

The influence of this difference on particular personnel systems is considerable. It sets the very character of the system. The limitations of space permit mention of only a few of the many reasons for effects of this difference.

We have noted the large number of position classifiers in federal government. Why is this true of the federal government and not of some other systems, e.g., the academic, the military, the theological, and many industries? This is true because by the act of classification of positions, i.e., the allocation of grade (and, in some high-demand specialties, the allocation of series), the position-classifier sets the individual's pay. This is true however much we may contend that it is the supervisor who sets pay because he assigns the duties to the individual. He does assign duties but the classification process sets basic pay rate by its method of assigning series and grade to the position.

To take an example of rank in the man method, the military also classify military positions by grade and by specialty. This is really *pay-grade*, too but the difference is that the military incumbent is *not* paid for that position's grade. He is paid for his already-attained *personal* pay-grade. The classification of position, without the pay-determination value attached, is here relatively simple. It is done administratively, with an accuracy surprisingly close to civil service outcomes.

So, in some systems much attention is paid

² Public Law 429—81st Congress, italics supplied.

³ *Ibid.*, italics supplied.

to the classification of *people* and their qualifications. Evaluation of people—and their qualifications and developmental needs—might well be enhanced if position classifiers in the civil service became *people* classifiers also. They could do this now because personal qualifications already obtain in some degree in position classification. There is a more important reason for them to become *people* classifiers, which goes to the heart of this matter. When the career and personnel system does *not* depend upon the classification of the position occupied by an individual for determination of salary, then we must establish and employ some other method for differentiating between people as individuals *for the fundamental purpose of establishing individual salary*.

In such systems emphasis is given to the prime function of evaluating and appraising the *individual* comparatively with other individuals, reliably differentiating *among individual performances*, for individual pay-setting purposes.

Since the individual is the point of emphasis of the latter system it forces personnel people to search for appraisal systems for the comparative evaluation of individual performance. In the federal civil service system based on the evaluation of the position the evaluation of individual performance is not required and, therefore, only worked for sporadically.

If the "rank in the person" system were employed, the federal civil service career and personnel system profitably could turn to preoccupation with *people*, their growth, and their fulfillment. Posts could be made more

commensurate with the individual's capacity and contribution. Their freedom to participate, after their own desires, interests and capacities, in serving and advancing an equivalent freedom through the entire world would be increased.

When an article, such as that by Harold Leich, says that "rank-in-the-position" and "rank-in-the-person" can live together in a personnel system because the individual conditions his position, the truth of that statement is readily apparent. People do condition positions and positions condition people. This is probably true in all systems but it does not answer the question of which of the two, "pay-is-for-the-position" or "pay-is-for-the-person," *dominates*. How pervasive and how influential is that dominance to the very character of the career and personnel system? If the values of the existing dominance become questionable, should there be a change in the system?

If the thesis of this paper is correct, it is possible to suggest that when pay becomes based upon and responsive to the evaluation of the performance of individuals in terms of their demonstrated competency and capability in individual contribution to the affairs of government, we shall have a far different career civil service than one where salary is based upon the position occupied. We shall have a far happier and more effective group of true personnel people when those who are now called position classifiers become *people* classifiers.

TRUMAN G. BENEDICT
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Editorial Comment

A SALUTE TO ROBERT S. BROOKINGS

The institutional flowering of one pioneer's ideas reflects the wider development of public administration since World War I. At diverse times this movement is especially revealed by milestones in the growth of various institutions and ideas. This particular encomium is timely now.

IN the summer of 1960, to make way for the new Executive Office Building, the Brookings Institution of Washington, D. C. moved to a much larger and more imposing building on Massachusetts Avenue. Brookings has not only acquired a new home, but also, in recent years, has greatly expanded its program and acquired a dynamic quality reminiscent of Robert S. Brookings himself.

It is appropriate, at this time, to recall the remarkable career of Mr. Brookings. A wood-ware salesman at 17, he became five years later the head of his company and made it foremost in its field within a decade. He moved on into real estate, lumbering and transportation, crowning his business achievements by establishing, in 1895, a consolidated, widely-copied, railroad freight terminal for St. Louis.

At 46 he entered upon the second period of his life that involved him in the cause of higher education. He endeavored to interest Andrew Carnegie in Washington University, but Carnegie turned tables on him and involved him as one of the original trustees of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Brookings was moved further toward public affairs through meeting Frederick A. Cleveland and when the Institute for Government Research was formed in 1916 to forward the legislative struggle for improved budgeting and accounting in the federal government, Brookings became a member of the Board.

It was after Brookings' war experience on the War Industries Board and later as Chairman of the Price-Fixing Committee, where his authority was second only to President Wilson's that his interest in public affairs really matured. In 1919, he revived the financially starved Institute of Government Research, going hat in hand from office to office, raising funds first to meet the payroll, then securing funds to tide the Institute over for a season, and then for a five-year period. In 1922, Brookings induced the Carnegie Corporation to

contribute funds to sustain another of his dreams, a related Institute of Economics.

In 1924, he personally provided funds for a third agency to help democracy function, the Graduate School of Economics and Government. The School did not quite meet his expectations. Brookings felt that too many of the students were preparing to teach when he wanted them to be civil servants and—God willing—statesmen.

In 1927, the Institute for Government Research, the Institute of Economics and the Graduate School were consolidated to form the Brookings Institution.

Today more than at any time in its history, the Brookings Institution is more nearly functioning as the men who founded it intended. Laurin Henry's study of presidential transitions and its relationship to the Brookings Institution's facilitation of the recent presidential transition provide an outstanding example of Brookings' method of combining research, education, and publication to contribute to the solution of practical governmental problems.

There are executive conferences for officials from all levels of government; middle management seminars covering a wide range of topics in political science, economics, and current affairs; a federal executive fellowship program enabling ten federal executives to spend time in advanced study at Brookings; a new program of public affairs fellowships bringing young men and women to Washington for six months' assignments as special assistants to federal executives; and special meetings for members of Congress.

A salute is in order. Although Robert S. Brookings' interest in public affairs matured late in his life, nearly 30 years after his death his creative energy is affecting public administration and public policy more than ever.

JOHN A. PERKINS
Editor-in-Chief

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